

Marine Corps Air Station
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:SEB:jhv
5750
6 January 1975

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31
(2) Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: Command Chronology, period of 1 July 1974 through 31 December 1974

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1D
(b) WgO 5750.2
(c) GruO 5750.1

Encl: (1) CO, MCAS ltr GS:FCF:jcp of 13 Aug 1974
(2) "Air Station Golfers Participate in Tourney"
JETSTREAM 6 Sept 1974
(3) VMFA-251 OpPlan 3-74
(4) "T-Bolt Pilots earn 1000 hrs" JETSTREAM 27 Sept 1974
(5) Dir, JARCC ltr OO:ACE:jmh over 1610 of 31 Oct 1974
(6) CO, MCAS Beaufort ltr S:FCF:ejm of 17 Oct 1974
(7) CO, VMFA-251 ltr 1:JLM:dbm 3301 of 23 Apr 1974 w/end
(8) CO, MCAS Beaufort ltr GS:FCF:jcp of 21 Nov 1974
(9) Reprint from "The Hot Dope Sheet"
(10) VMFA-251 OpPlan 4-74
(11) Photograph of VMFA-251 Aircraft at Nellis AFB
(12) CG FMFLant msg 202204Z Dec 74
(13) VMFA-251 SqdnBul 4790 Of 30 Nov 1974
(14) Fitness Report Fact Sheet
(15) CO, VMFA-251 ltr 3:NGGK:pch over 3500 of 8 Aug 1974
w/end
(16) Diagram of VMFA-251 Functional Nucleus Organization
(17) CO, VMFA-251 ltr 1:JLM:taw over 5000 of 24 Oct 1974

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation/Location. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron Two Five One, Marine Aircraft Group Three One, Second Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina 29902.

b. Period Covered. 1 July 1974 through 31 December 1974

ENCLOSURE (5)

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c. Command and Staff.

Commanding Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	LTCOL J. L. MAVRETIC
Executive Officer	15 Jul-31 Dec 74	MAJ F. A. HUEY
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	MAJ H. F. SHARP
Operations Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	MAJ N. G. G. KERR
Administrative Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	CAPT R. W. CHAMBLISS
Intelligence Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	CAPT S. L. RICHARDS
Materiel Division Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	CAPT P. L. KRANKER
Aviation Safety Officer	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	FLTLT J. H. HAINES
Flight Surgeon	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	LT R. HODGES
Sergeant Major	1 Jul-31 Dec 74	1STSGT J. URITESCU

d. Average Squadron Strength.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
July	29	165
August	29	166
September	36	162
October	38	170
November	36	172
December	35	173

2. Sequence of Events

a. July

1. VMFA-251 flight operations were 124 sorties and 171.2 flight hours during July.

2. 14 July: The Squadron returned from a thirty day deployment as the CinCLant Detachment 14 (DET-14) at NAS Key West. During that thirty day period the Squadron flew 42 sorties for 52.6 hours with three hot pad aircraft.

3. 15-16 July: A Safety stand down was held. Extensive use of the Squadron's video tape system was made. On the second day of the standdown MAJGEN SPANIER, the Commanding General of the 2nd MAW viewed a video tape presentation and

addressed squadron personnel on the importance of safety.

4. Commencing in July, the S-2 incorporated an intelligence brief into all the squadron's flight briefings.

5. 16 July: The Commanding Officer addressed all the Squadron's dependents. This was a part of the Unit's continuing Family Familiarization Program. The attendees were advised of projected deployments and local operations. Emphasis was placed on the Squadron member's responsibility to his dependents during deployments or other absences. A Dependents Deployment Folder was prepared by 1STLT G. ROHLOFF and distributed to all dependents during the family presentation.

6. 23-24 July: MAJ N. G. G. KERR and CAPT W. W. MOORE attended the standardization of Training Aids Conference for the Navy/Marine Corps F-4 aircraft held at NTEC Orlando, Fla. All forms of training media were considered.

7. 25 July: VMFA-251 stood the Second Marine Aircraft Wing Administrative and Material Inspection. The Officer's Uniform, SNCO's Uniform, and the 1st Platoon's Uniform inspections received a grade of Satisfactory with minor discrepancies, as did the 2nd Platoon in drill. Maintenance received a Satisfactory with discrepancies. Flight Equipment, Ordnance and Public Affairs received noteworthy commendations.

8. 29 July - 2 August: First Lieutenant J. M. SWEENEY attended the Marine Corps Aviation Ordnance Officers Symposium at the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, Calif. Lt SWEENEY participated in the review of current weapons system technology, analysis of progress and problems, discussion of new requirements and the development of long range plans.

9. 31 July: The quarterly PFT was conducted. The Squadron's passing percentage was 93, as a result, VMFA-251 won the MAG-31 Quarterly PFT Award.

10. 31 July: MAJ N. G. G. KERR and MAJ H. F. SHARP attended the Air Operations/Logistics Conference for Operation "Deep Furrow 74" at Norfolk, Va.

b. August

1. In August 1974 this squadron flew 178 sorties for 339.8 flight hours.

2. 3 August: VMFA-251 provided an aircraft and crew for static display at NAS Brunswick, Me. CAPT E. STENMAN received a Letter of Appreciation from NAS Brunswick for his performance of duty that day.

3. 7 August: Aircrewmen from this Squadron attended a VFAX brief presented by McDonnell Douglas. The representatives from McDonnell Douglas desired aircrew Human Factor inputs for the design of their NAVY single seat Light-Weight Fighter Proposal.

4. 19 August: A Dining-In with wives and guests was held at the MCAS Beaufort Officer's Club. VMFA-251 and their ladies hosted BGEN A. O'DONNELL, AWC of 2nd MAW and his wife.

5. 23 August: Colonel J. V. COX from Headquarters, Marine Corps visited the squadron and received a briefing from the Executive Officer, MAJ F. A. HUEY, on this Squadron's readiness and its future projections.

6. 20 August: BGEN E. R. MILLER, JR, Deputy Commander, FMFLant, visited the squadron and was briefed on VMFA-251's proposal to prepare video tape mission briefing guides for all F-4J Syllabus training sorties.

7. 20 August: BGEN A. O'DONNELL, AWC 2nd MAW, flew a radar intercept mission with this Squadron. His Radar Intercept Officer was Flt Lt J. H. HAINES, RAF Exchange Officer, who accrued his 1000th hour in the F-4 during that sortie.

8. 29 August: This Squadron was awarded the MCAS Ground Safety Award for the month of July. VMFA-251 had been second in each of the preceeding three months. (Enclosure 1.)

9. 26-30 August: First Sergeant J. URITESCU participated in the 1974 East Coast Regional Golf Championships held at Camp Lejeune. (Enclosure 2.)

10. 30 August: This Squadron completed the 1974 Navy Relief drive by collecting 100.7 percent of its assigned goal.

c. September

1. During the month of September the Squadron flew 256 sorties for 436.0 hours.

2. 9 September: Maj N. G. G. KERR and Capt R. HAYNES attended a predeployment conference for Sep 14 hosted by Cdr. HEDLEY, the Operations Officer of NAS Key West.

3. 9 - 12 September: Capt W. W. MOORE attended the F-4 NATOPS Conference as the MAG-31 representative. The conference was hosted by the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation at St. Louis, Mo.

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4. 14 September: VMFA-251 assumed the DET-14 commitment at NAS Key West. (Enclosure 3)

5. 15 September: MAJ J. BRATON and CWO W. R. LePORE of MAWTULANT conducted a thorough Cuban Air Order of Battle/Capabilities briefing for the DET-14 aircrews.

6. 19 September: CAPT R. HAYNES and 1STLT J. CLUELOW each logged their 1000th hour of safe flying in the F-4J Phantom as Radar Intercept Officers. (Enclosure 4)

7. 25 September: MAJ N. G. G. KERR and CAPT H. L. LOGAN III visited McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis, Mo. for a VFAX liaison visit and to evaluate estimated VFAX performance against current threat aircraft in the ACM simulator.

8. 26 September: 1STLT T. NICHOLSON briefed twenty Air Force ROTC Cadets from Berkley High School in Charleston SC., and conducted them on a tour of the Squadron's facilities and aircraft.

9. 30 September: An after hours Security Inspection was conducted by the 8th Counter Intelligence Team with excellent results. No violations or practices hazardous to security were noted.

10. 30 September: VMFA-251 ended monthly flight operations having attained 134 percent of its flight hour projection.

11. During the last week of September the CNAL Maintenance Assistance Team inspected VMFA-251's Aircraft Maintenance Department. After spending three and a half days with this Squadron and equal time with other squadrons in the Air Group, VMFA-251 was judged to have the best maintenance program within MAG-31.

d. October

1. During the month of October VMFA-251 flew 217 sorties resulting in 330.4 flight hours.

2. 9 - 10 October: The Second MAW Safety Survey was conducted at this Squadron. Three areas were judged to be Outstanding and all other areas received Satisfactory grades.

3. 14 October: The Squadron stood down from the DET-14 commitment at NAS Key West. During this deployment, in keeping with the Commander's policy of giving leadership positions to junior officers, two Captains served as Det OICs. Both these

Officers received letters of Recognition from the Director of the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center at Key West. (Enclosure 5)

4. 17 October: VMFA-251 was announced as the co-winner of the MCAS Ground Safety Award for the month of September. (Enclosure 6)

5. 21 - 25 October: MAJ N. G. G. KERR and CAPT W. W. MOORE attended the F-4 Tactical Manual Conference at the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis, Mo.

6. 31 October: VMFA-251 ended monthly flight operations having attained 102 percent of its projected flight hour goal.

e. November

1. In the month of November VMFA-251 flew 227 sorties for 370.2 hours.

2. 6 November: 1STLT NICHOLSON gave a brief and conducted a tour of VMFA-251 and the F-4J for twenty-five Cub Scouts of Pack 283.

3. 6 November: MAJGEN SPANJER, CG, 2nd MAW, visited the Squadron to attend a dress rehearsal presentation for the upcoming visit by the Commandant.

4. 4 - 6 November: CAPT W. W. MOORE attended a conference at the Singer Company in New York concerning the F-4J Weapons System Trainer (2F-88).

5. 13 November: In the early morning hours this Squadron flew three night sorties in support of the NORAD Exercise "SNOWTIME".

6. 13 - 14 November: The Squadron flew four sorties in support of BASCOLEX 7-74 at Camp Lejeune.

7. 14 November: The Commandant of the Marine Corps visited MCAS Beaufort. He received a MAG-31 Command Brief and a brief from LTCOL J. L. MAVRETIC on four projects undertaken by VMFA-251: (A) Aircrew Flight Equipment, (Enclosure 17) (B) Suitcase Emergency Procedures Trainer, (Enclosure 7), (C) VMFA Functional Organization, and (D) the Systems Approach to Aircrew Training.

8. 21 November: COL L. A. MADERA, CO MAG-31, presented VMFA-251 with the MCAS Beaufort Ground Safety Award for the month of October. (Enclosure 8.)

9. 21 November: COL L. A. MADERA, CO MAG-31, presented to this Squadron the MAG-31 PFT Award for having the highest percentage of passing scores during the months of July through September of this year.

10. The Combined Federal Campaign was completed with VMFA-251 contributing 370 percent of its assigned goal. The Squadron contributed \$1,875.

11. 30 November: This Squadron flew 105.5 percent of its planned flight hours.

12. LTCOL J. L. MAVRETIC published an article concerning the relationship between Annual Leave and safety in "The Hot Dope Sheet", the 2nd MAW Safety Newsletter. (Enclosure 9.)

f. December

1. During the month of December this Squadron flew 237 sorties for 344.9 flight hours.

2. 3 - 6 December: VMFA-251 was host to Mr. JEFF ETHELL of "Air International Magazine". Mr. ETHELL, who is writing a feature article on Marine Corps Aviation, was virtually "joined" to the Squadron, as he participated in all phases of Squadron flying and social activities.

3. 7 - 14 December: Four aircraft, pilots, and RIOs, and 28 enlisted personnel deployed to Nellis AFB. During this period, VMFA-251 flew 44 Air Combat Maneuvering sorties against USAF T-38 aircraft of the 64th Fighter Weapons Aggressor Squadron. Additionally, the aircrews were given briefings on Soviet Aviation Training and Fighter Tactics. (Enclosure 10 & 11.)

4. 16 - 20 December: MAWTULANT conducted Air Combat Tactics Instructor Training for two crews of VMFA-251.

5. 18 - 19 December: Seven Squadron Officers attended static displays and briefings on the F-16 and F-17 aircraft at Edwards AFB. Ca.

6. 18 December: MAJ N. G. G. KERR spoke to FMFLANT Training Symposium at Norfolk, Va. The subject of his speech was "The Systems Approach to Training" MAJ KERR received "Well Done" messages from both the CG, FMFLANT, and CG 2nd MAW for his presentation. (Enclosure 12.)

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7. 31 December: VMFA-251 completed flight operations having achieved 103.3 percent of its proposed flight hour goals.

3. Narrative Summary.

At the beginning of the Fiscal Year VMFA-251 set itself the goal of measurably improving its probability of success in battle through the production of full systems aircraft flown by full systems capable aircrews. To achieve this goal, intermediate milestones were set and various experimental means to more efficiently attain this paramount goal were attempted.

After the "Thunderbolts" goal had been set the next step was to determine a logical method of planning and executing the required sequence of intermediate steps to achieve the goal. It was decided that the Monthly Maintenance Plan was a logical vehicle to use. As a result, this standard maintenance tool was vastly expanded to include all squadron activities and thus has become a single source document for all Squadron functions. This restructured Monthly Maintenance Plan is known as the Squadron Planning Document (Enclosure 13). The Squadron makes optimum use of the Monthly Planning Document to insure that each individual knows what the organization expects of him in specific terms and what the overall objectives of the Squadron are during the planning period. Additionally, the Planning Document forces each department to forecast accurately what it can really achieve during the month. Since the Planning Document tells higher commanders what this Squadron expects to achieve, based on actual versus predicted results, higher commands can judge VMFA-251's performance.

Another means which this Squadron has used to achieve its goal of full systems capable aircrews is to employ new, more efficient tools for training and standardization of aircrews. One such tool is the "251 Playbook". A "Playbook" is a three-ring binder issued to each officer; it is utilized as a centralized file for personal notes taken by the aircrewmen at AOMs and training lectures. In addition, the Operations Department produces handouts for insertion in the "Playbook". "Playbook Inserts" are items which will have permanent professional significance to the aircrewmen. One example of the type handout which is incorporated into the Playbook is the Fitness Report Counseling and Fact Sheet (Enclosure 14). A second tool used to improve training is the video tape cassette system (Enclosure 15). This system is used to: (A) produce standardized video tape briefings for syllabus training missions, (B) produce video tapes for Squadron ground training and phase briefs, and (C) to disseminate command policy or non recurring information to all hands on an individualized basis. Taping of T&R Manual syllabus sorties was completed in November and the use of these tapes enhances the quality and standardization of each training

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flight within the Squadron.

To increase overall efficiency the Squadron structure was reorganized to allow the staff sections the means to accomplish their assigned tasks. For instance since the Maintenance Department uses the bulk of assigned personnel, under the new structure the Personnel Officer is in the Maintenance Department vice the S-1 section. The Squadron has six sections each having well defined responsibilities which when interfaced covers the entire spectrum of squadron activities (Enclosure 16). This organizational model is defined as the "Functional Nucleus" and is being employed as a more rational approach to VMFA squadron organization. It results in reduced effort being spent on the secondary concerns of the Squadron.

The most important means of achieving the Squadron goal is how operational flight time is employed. One measure of this facet of training is the production of meaningful syllabus sorties (Xs). Since the July through September period we have reduced our hours flown to X produced ratio considerably while continuing to consistently meet flight time goals. This increased efficiency and training was the result of a change in emphasis from basic procedural airmanship to the fullest tactical employment of the F-4J in Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) Training and other areas. While the Squadron was increasing its X production it has also generally met an ancillary goal that 20 percent of each month's flight time would be accomplished at night.

An additional result of the use of these important tools has been improved safety. During this period the Squadron has flown 1991.0 hours without an aircraft accident. Furthermore, because of the emphasis on safety within this command, the Squadron has received the monthly MCAS Beaufort Ground Safety Award three times during the past six months and has been second the other three months. A safety oriented project that this Squadron has been working on, resulted in the recommendation to the Naval Safety Center in November for utilizing improved Aircrew Flight Equipment. (Enclosure 17). The improved equipment includes a full set of NOMEX underwear, a streamlined flight suit, and an improved survival vest. This flight equipment provides greater flash fire protection, is comfortable without restricting movement, is cheaper and uses off-the-shelf items. All the flight equipment has been used and evaluated within the Squadron during this reporting period.

At the end of the first half of the Fiscal Year, VMFA-251 believes that during the past months the new efficient tools that we have utilized have placed us well on the path for achieving our stated goal of becoming the best fighter squadron in the Marine Corps.

4. Commanders Comments.

a. 1 July 1974 to 20 July 1974

This period was a productive one for the Thunderbolts. We completed DET-14 and the second half of FY-74 without any accidents or incidents. On the four day Fourth of July weekend we had no traffic or vacation accidents. This accident free period was due, in part, to the lectures, movies, and demonstrations presented to all VMFA-251 Marines by local safety and law enforcement officials. This holiday safety program was coordinated by FltLt HAINES.

(1) The Little League baseball team sponsored by VMFA-251 won their league and had three members selected for the local All-Star Team.

(2) The Operations Department submitted recommended changes to the Second MAW Translant SOP and is scheduling airborne tests of the validity of the NATOPS flight planning data.

(3) At present there is no working area available to the squadron where unrestricted IFR air-intercept training can be flown. At some point in the syllabus, aircrews must be able to begin flying all air intercept missions in an IFR environment. We are beginning to try to remedy this deficiency.

(4) Bachelor officers, who reside in the BOQ, must now go to the General Mess if they want to eat breakfast. This has a negative effect on Aviation Safety and Officer morale. The BOQ wardroom was closed as an economy measure and essential feeding of bachelor officers commenced at the COM(O). This relocation of the place of feeding caused a significant reduction of breakfast eaters. Next, again due to economy, essential feeding for breakfast was relocated at the General Mess. Now breakfastteating is virtually non-existent. I believe its essential that breakfast be made available to bachelor officers at or near their quarters.

(5) Range quotas for the "B" course have not been available during this reporting period. We now must complete a years requalification in 3 1/2 months. This will have an adverse impact on work force availability for aircraft maintenance. MCAS Beaufort and its tenant units must have a monthly percentage of range times at Parris Island if we are to efficiently requalify riflemen.

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(6) Under the latest regulations, no assistance is provided to prepare the individual Marine for his G.E.D. tests. Currently, a Marine must pay ten dollars and sit down and take his test. If the Marine Corps goal is for each Marine to be a high school graduate (or equivalent), then we must devote some assets to aid in the process.

(7) Rotable pools of components and GSE may not be the best system for units in a high readiness posture. The economies of scale may be counterproductive when subordinate units are geographically separated. We are beginning to investigate the impact of squadron deployments upon the remaining squadrons in an effort to minimize it.

(8) We are continuing to improve our Squadron Planning Document and are now studying the effects of unscheduled maintenance generated by message directives upon our monthly maintenance for which we are required to perform maintenance for which we have not planned. Since the planned monthly maintenance schedule expands all the available maintenance man hours, each unexpected message directing man hours expenditure causes either the omission of preplanned activities or overtime.

b. 20 July 1974 to 20 August 1974

We expect this period to be the bottom of the summer personnel rotation cycle. We expect to increase our flight hour production and aircraft systems availability. So long as we receive balanced assets of OFC-01 dollars, material, and personnel the new flight hour targets are attainable. We will have to increase our cross-country rate and have programs underway to use cross-country flights to improve aircrew proficiency and maintain high standards of safety when away from home base.

After waiting over a year for what was supposed to take only four (4) months, VMFA-251 moved into its renovated barracks. Although the window drapes, rugs, and bed lamps are still missing, the barracks are in good condition and a welcomed relief from sharing parts of two barracks with two other squadrons.

VMFA-251 won the MCAS Beaufort Ground Safety Award for July. We had come in second for three months and now have won it. IstLt Jay CLUELOW is the Thunderbolt Ground Safety Officer and he, and his ground safety committee, have been working hard for this award for a long time.

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In order to reduce confusion and lessen the resistance to change, we have eliminated the Logistics Department from the Squadron's trial organization and renamed it the Aircraft Maintenance Department. Additionally, within the Executive Department, we have retitled the Quality Assurance Representative as the Technical Inspector. Neither change affects functions or roles within the organization.

c. 20 August 1974 to 20 September 1974

The availability of full systems aircraft for assignment to operational missions, therefore, depends principally on the quality of the men, money and material assigned to a squadron and the quality of assigned manpower. The squadron commander has little control over quantity of assets and limited control over the quality of his manpower. What the squadron commander can do is maximize the units production within the constraints of the determinant variable; ie. most scarce resource.

Each squadron in the Second Marine Aircraft Wing provides a capability for senior commanders. The capability of a Marine Fighter Attack Squadron is to put ordnance on a target. On an airborne target, the ordnance is missiles, and on a ground target, the ordnance is conventional amunitions. The two principal components of the capability to put ordnance on target are full systems aircraft and full systems capable aircrews.¹⁴² In order to produce and develop these two components, the organizational commander must be provided balanced assets in three sectors; men, money and material.³ The impact of the balanced assignment of men, money and material is most apparent in the production of full system aircraft. A shortage in any of the three sectors will be the determinant variable of production capability and an excess in any sector produces idle assets which is economically inefficient.⁴ Stated another way, a shortage in one sector to some degree, causes an excess in the other two.

During my tenure as Commanding Officer of VMFA-251 we have run the gamut from scarce material during March and April, through scarce money during April and May to scarce manpower during June and July. As the scarcity of one of the three resources changed, we were required to adjust our operating procedures accordingly. Usually, scarce material was offset by increased cannibilization and scarce manpower was offset by longer working hours. Scarce money (OFC-01) was offset by aircraft

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configuration changes and adjustments to flight procedures. In each case where the magnitude of resource deficiency exceeded the squadron's capacity to compensate, the squadron had a short fall in full system aircraft production. We do not have adequate techniques to measure the impact of resource shortages at the organizational level. Questions such as "what is the production impact of 50% availability of T/O in MOS 66XX", are difficult to quantify but we do know where in an impact. I believe it would help us to manage if we tried to establish a baseline, be it ever so crude, from which we (in the F-4J community) were working - for example: with T/O in rank and MOS, under FAD-1 (no NORS or ANFE) and complete IMRL, with no shortage in OFC-01, twelve F-4J's should produce a level of quantity or quality activity. By establishing a baseline, we could begin to analyze the effects of sector shortages upon it. The rationale suggests that the commanders within MAG-31 should sit down together and hammer out what we believe to be a baseline, get 2nd MAW (perhaps higher) concurrence and then begin to refine it over time. Unless we establish some baseline, we'll never know when we have been over extended or when we're underachieving.

In my opinion, total flight hours are too crude a measure to meet our needs. Expended flight hours should be directly related to the second component of a squadron's capability - full systems capable aircrews. We need to measure what we get for expended flight hours against what we expected to get. I think our Training and Readiness Manual is an excellent point of departure. In my judgement, we should use the T&R Manual as the principal source document for resource allocation and training requirements from the congressional level down. My logic for this follows: assume we know the requirements for success in battle, then we know what we have to learn. If we reduce what we have to learn to do to be successful in battle into sorties, then we have a T&R Manual which will withstand criticism at any level. Once we have a T&R Manual that is respected at all levels, then resource requirements logically follow - each sortie requires a given number of aircraft configured in a certain manner, flying a certain length of time in a specified area with a special mix of instructor/trainee aircrewmembers. The aircraft requirement to support T&R Manual sorties drives the need for levels of manpower, money and material. In the past, we may have changed the T&R Manual to meet the prevailing constraints of men, money or material. I believe this procedure is counter productive. The best interests of the F-4J community in my opinion, are served by a T&R Manual that reflects the requirements for success in battle; from such a manual, most other significant requirements will logically follow.

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NOTES:

1. A full systems aircraft is an aircraft in which the sub-systems requisite to mission accomplishment on a single sortie function properly until the mission has been completed.
2. A full systems capable aircrew is an aircrew which can operate, to the design limits, each aircraft subsystem, in any combination required, to accomplish the mission assigned on a single sortie.
3. Material is a genetic term which includes all classes of supplies as well as facilities.
4. There are some actions available at the organizational level to offset minor asset imbalances; ie., working longer hours to make up for personnel shortages or cannibalization to make up for supply shortages. However, these are short run actions which are inefficient.
5. Expended flight hours represent a units use of men, money and material.

d. 20 September 1974 to 20 October 1974

Over the past ten (10) months, I have had the opportunity to be responsible for the effects that personnel turnover has on the productivity and combat readiness of this Squadron. As a measure of the effect of personnel turnover on combat readiness, I ask, "How does it effect our chances for success in battle", since how a team performs in garrison usually determines how it fights. As a measure of the effect of personnel turnover on productivity, I use the definition provided by Clovis R. Shephard in his book, Small Groups, Some Sociological Perspectives, "A successful group is a group with high cohesion and high productivity, in which objectives, role differentiation, values and norms, and membership criteria are clear and agreed upon, and in which communication is open and full". Although the sample is small, one squadron for one commander's tour, some of the observations noted below may be germane to Marine Corps Aviation in general.

a. Productivity. A work force can only do what it knows how to do. A squadron can train its personnel on-the-job or during periods devoted to technical subjects training. High enlisted turnover rates require that a large percentage of training time be devoted to providing basics for the newly joined. Technical training classes are restricted by the

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member with the least knowledge, and each class usually has one or more new members. Seldom does any class held at the squadron level progress to the more complex tasks that can be performed by the OMA and which have the maximum pay off in productivity. We just never get very far into our technical training because we have to spend so much time catching up the new men.

We have a high ratio of supervised to unsupervised work, with a concomitant reduction in supervisor time available for planning and innovation. Again, the supervisor must spend so much time on-the-job training the constant flow of new men in his work center that he doesn't have the hours available to maximize the efforts of his work center as a whole.

High personnel turnover makes it difficult to plan for and train replacements. A squadron should have an orderly progression of school trained Marines in key billets. However, this is hard to do when PCS is directed without knowledge of the individual's role in the squadron. Additionally, we have found that high turnover adversely affects the slow starter. Many Marines, "come into their own", after about six months in a unit. Frequent movement of these individuals keeps them in a continuing period of readjustment, therefore, they are not as productive as they could be.

Work center supervisors are limited in the depth of counselling they can provide an individual when there is high personnel turnover. Frequent turnover of supervisors, or those supervised, often does not permit enough observation time for supervisors to identify causes for malperformance. Usually the supervisor treats effects rather than causes to the benefit of no one. Work center supervisors simply are not able to stay with their men for an appropriate duration to know them well enough to obtain the most from each individual. To some degree, our U.A. rate is a reflection of this facet of the personnel turnover problem.

Administratively, we impose an excessive workload through high personnel turnover. Inputs to the MMS system are generated at the squadron, and daily error rates, and the personnel dissatisfaction caused by these errors are to some considerable extent caused by frequent personnel movement.

Although not quantifiable, personnel turbulence seems to effect unit esprit. In my judgement, it causes a mood of transience which pervades the command. I see it in the barracks where theft and damage are excessive, where police is a major effort, and where control of occupancy is often difficult.

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Bachelor enlisted Marines generally view their barracks as a motel rather than their home. I see a similar effect on reenlistment. Since no unit roots are developed, the first tour Marine passes through the Corps on his way to "permanent" civilian employment. He was not trained in depth, no one really knew him as an individual, and he did not identify with his work center. He has no inner drive to reenlist and our Corps loses an asset. In an all-volunteer environment, without draft motivated enlistment, all services must compete for manpower with civilian industry. We are basically forced to play the recruiting game by national rules over which we have little control. Unless we offer some semblance of job stability, we are going to have trouble getting and keeping quality manpower.

b. Combat Readiness

The Marine Corps advertizes itself as a Force in Readiness. Ready to go anywhere on short notices, and to be successful in battle upon arrival. A force in readiness needs top performance for the opening moves, not a crowd thrown together for the deployment; e.g., current Forstat readiness augmentation. Aircrew turnover inhibits the development of maximum aircrew capabilities in spite of constant planning for coherent aircrew training. In order to optimize the F-4J weapon system, individual aircraft crews, as well as section and division crew teams, must be stabilized and must fly together for months. Anything less means that we will field a team that cannot fly the aircraft to its limits. Regardless of the convenience in personnel handling on an individual basis, and in spite of the difficulties caused by tactical squadrons stabilized for 18 or more months, the first consideration must be success in battle and that is best achieved by crews that have flown together a great deal. If we are to quickly put our best in the field, we need to show this requirement in our T&R Manual. We must not draw the wrong conclusions from the Vietnam Campaign. The first squadrons committed were stabilized units - only when the campaign continued for years did individual rotation make sense under the existant policies. We should not conclude that the "real world" requires individual rotation, but rather that the "real world" requires stabilized units for the early shock effect. The change to individual rotation should be made only if the duration of conflict is long. I have been assigned to both stabilized units and those maintained through individual rotation, in garrison and combat, and believe that stabilized tactical squadrons put the keenest edge on the sword of airpower. There is another

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troublesome facet to individual rotation, and adverse effect upon squadron safety. We have had a higher incident rate due to inexperience on the job, and we spend an inordinant amount of time on basic safety training due to repetition for the newly joined. Personnel turnover works against developing depth and breath in safety awareness. In summary, personnel turnover initially reduces the tactical squadron's capability for success in battle, and is detrimental to developing the Espirit de Corps for which we are justly famous. I believe we must accept some inefficiencies in personnel administration in order to improve our combat capabilities and our retention rates. A major first step is reducing personnel turbulence at the organization level.

e. 20 October 1974 to 20 November 1974

During this period, VMFA-251 completed the third of its four major projects for FY-75. The recommendation to Naval Safety Center for improved Aircrew Flight Equipment has been forwarded via appropriate command channels. Basically, the improved equipment includes a full set of NOMEX underwear (socks, long johns, turtle-neck long sleeve undershirt, and hood), a streamlined flying suit, and an improved survival vest. This improved flight equipment will provide greater flash fire protection and more comfortable survival equipment for less cost using off-the-shelf items.

f. 20 November 1974 to 20 December 1974

Air Bases, Marine Aircraft Wings, Air Groups and Squadrons all exist for one primary reason - to put full system aircraft, manned by full system capable aircrews, in the air in order to be successful in battle. Basically, Wing and Groups provide guidance, direction and support. Squadrons execute their orders. Under the Air Bases concept, Air Stations are "landlords" and Squadrons are "tenants". As in most joint endeavors, there is often legitimate confusion over roles and responsibilities and frequent overlap of activity between these four agencies. These inefficiencies are bothersome but tolerable; so long as the basic priority, putting aircraft in the sky that can be successful in battle, is understood by all. These inefficiencies become intolerable when that basic priority is pre-empted.

Wings and Group exist to support and direct squadrons. The impetus of service is toward the squadron. The flow of men and material should be toward the squadron. An indicator

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of this thrust toward the squadron is staff visits from higher headquarters. This squadron is not suffering from too many staff visits. Additionally, the visits and inspections that do occur are frequently concerned with mundane matters that do not improve readiness. I see too many people waiting to be told about problems and too few people trying to prevent problems from arising in the first place. It seems as though we are content to be perscriptive rather than preventive.

Air Bases exist because aircraft fly, not vice versa. The tenant squadron commander should expect the facilities and services he needs. He should expect the "landlord" to take the initiative to ensure that the tenant squadron's requirements are met. During the past year, I have not been visited by a single executive staff officer from the Air Station.

It seems to me that we are developing squadron commanders who are conditioned to accept substandard support; squadron commanders who accept tasks without the assets to accomplish them; squadron commanders who have lost sight of the real priorities and squadrons that look good on paper but cannot fly their aircraft. Perhaps we should, from time to time, seriously review our priorities.

Our current OFC 21 shortage is a good indicator of skewed priorities. At a time when manpower shortages are acknowledged, when each man must be as productive as possible, we cut to zero the quarterly funds that are intended to improve individual skills through formal schools.

In my year as a squadron commander, there has been frequent instances when, "putting aircraft in the sky" has assumed, in my opinion, secondary importance. High scores on the PFT, high administrative STAR percentages or MCI completions or rifle requalification rates are no substitute for aircraft and aircrew readiness. A base library with ten thousand volumes or a new Officer's Club can't substitute for the lack of overland training airspace. Noteworthy inspection results pale when a squadron repeatedly fails to fly its published flight schedule.

Each day we have thousands of dollars of assets idle for want of a few dollars worth of spares or repairables. During this reporting period, half of our aircraft have been idle each day due to NORS. We cannot properly train our aircrews because subsystems are ANFE (we have averaged over 40 each day this period). We simply are not wisely using the taxpayers dollars and the nations resources. Economies in supplies are inefficient when aircraft do not fly for want of parts.

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We devote vast resources to develop sophisticated indicators of safety but little attention is devoted to developing sophisticated indicators of aircrew readiness; e.g., lack of training munitions, ACMR pods and MAWTULANT instructor pilots who barely meet annual flight minimums. We simply do not stress operational readiness as much as we do safety.

It seems to me that we have assumed we are doing well operationally and that we can concentrate on other things - wrong. We have few full systems capable aircrews and we don't have full system aircraft. Moreover, we are a long way from them and we need to get back to basics. In my opinion, we own much more aircraft capability than we are prepared either to maintain, or to train to employ.

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