

MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 251  
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant  
Marine Corps Air Station  
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:JMT:dew  
5750  
7 July 1971

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31  
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant  
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: Command Chronology, 1 January 1971 through 30 June 1971

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A W/CH # 1  
(b) WgO 5750.1A  
(c) ASO 5750.1A  
(d) GruO 5750.1

Encl: (1) ✓ Post-deployment Report, NS Roosevelt Roads, P.R. (Original Only)

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation/Location

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron Two-Five-One, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902.

b. Period Covered

1 January 1971 through 30 June 1971.

c. Command and Staff

|                        |                       |                    |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Commanding Officer     | LTCOL R. PLANT        | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71   |
|                        | MAJOR J. M. MEAD      | 9 MAR - 30 JUN 71  |
| Executive Officer      | MAJOR M. G. WADSWORTH | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71   |
|                        | MAJOR R. J. PETERSON  | 9 MAR - 9 APR 71   |
|                        | MAJOR G. DeJONG       | 10 APR - 24 MAY 71 |
|                        | MAJOR W. T. McFALL    | 25 MAY - 30 JUN 71 |
| Operations Officer     | MAJOR D. J. KIELY     | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71   |
|                        | CAPT L. W. STEWART    | 9 MAR - 30 JUN 71  |
| Administrative Officer | CAPT R. E. DAHART     | 1 JAN - 30 JUN 71  |
| Intelligence Officer   | 1/LT K. R. OEHM       | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71   |
|                        | CAPT J. D. ALLEN      | 9 MAR - 20 JUN 71  |
|                        | 1/LT D. A. NETTLES    | 21 JUN - 30 JUN 71 |

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|                              |                        |                   |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Aviation Safety Officer      | CAPT J. T. BRATON      | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71  |
|                              | FLTLT T. M. BOND (RAF) | 9 MAR -30 JUN 71  |
| Aircraft Maintenance Officer | MAJOR P. J. PEDERSON   | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71  |
|                              | CAPT C. L. CULLER      | 9 MAR -24 MAY 71  |
|                              | MAJOR G. DEJONG        | 25 MAY -30 JUN 71 |
| Flight Surgeon               | LT D. L. TRITCH (USN)  | 1 JAN -30 JUN 71  |
| Sergeant Major               | SGTMAJ J. E. WELSH     | 1 JAN - 8 MAR 71  |
|                              | SGTMAJ L. PARENT       | 9 MAR -30 JUN 71  |

d. Average Squadron Strength

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Officers</u> | <u>*Enlisted</u> |
|--------------|-----------------|------------------|
| JANUARY      | 60              | 263              |
| FEBRUARY     | 60              | 275              |
| MARCH        | 51              | 248              |
| APRIL        | 54              | 252              |
| MAY          | 53              | 258              |
| JUNE         | 53              | 255              |

\* DOES NOT INCLUDE PERSONNEL AUGMENTED TO INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY

Average Category "A" Personnel: Officers 62% CAT "A", Enlisted 12% CAT "A".

2. Sequence of Events

a. Personnel/Administration

During this reporting period, the following promotions were effected:

One First Sergeant promoted to Sergeant Major  
 Two Staff Sergeants promoted to Gunnery Sergeant  
 Four Sergeants promoted to Staff Sergeant  
 Twelve CPLs promoted to Sergeant  
 Seventeen LCPLs promoted to CPL  
 Twelve PFCs promoted to LCPL  
 Two PVTs promoted to PFC

Unit Diary errors were 12% for Fiscal Year 71

The following Awards were presented to squadron personnel:

MAJOR G. DEJONG received the Aviation Safety Award for 3000 hours accident free flying.

1/LT D. L. SNOOK

1/LT R. B. FYKE received Fire Bee Kill Plaques for scoring a direct hit on the Fire Bee maneuvering target while deployed to NS Roosevelt Roads.

1/LT T. F. WUNDERLICH received Navy Commendation Medal for Meritorious Service.



1/LT R. B. FYKE received Air Medal W/Gold Star for Heroic Duty  
 1/LT J. W. HAYNES received Navy Commendation Medal W/Combat V  
 SGT H. V. SHOEMAKER received Navy Commendation Medal W/Combat V  
 SGT K. A. ALDAG received Navy Achievement Medal for meritorious  
 service in Viet Nam  
 SGT L. K. COFFEY received Air Medals 2-17  
 1/LT R. B. FYKE received Navy Achievement Medal W/Combat V  
 CPL T. C. RANDALL received Navy Achievement Medal  
 Seven Good Conduct Medals 1st Award

b. Intelligence

Training for aircrews and intelligence personnel was conducted on a weekly basis. Extensive briefs on the Caribbean area by personnel from the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center at NAS Key West, Florida, were valuable additions to the squadrons intelligence training program. Representatives from the North American Defense Command briefed all aircrews on this squadrons role in the area of U.S. air defense. Frequent and continuing training sessions in recognition of Soviet Bloc aircraft and ships received active participation by all aircrew members. In the last week of June this training was culminated by a recognition test administered by representatives of the Second Marine Air Wing. The results of the test have not yet been received.

c. Training/NBC

In the past six months 42 hours were devoted to individual basic training, 16 hours to technical training, and 24 hours of required Group Training were completed. In addition:

- 28 aircrew members attended Air Combat Tactical Maneuvering Course.
- 44 aircrew members completed AWG-10 Weapons System Naval Aviation Maintenance Orientation course in May.
- 2. Officers were in attendance at Aircraft Maintenance Officer school
- 1 Radar Interdept Officer completed the Basic Conventional Weapons Delivery course.
- 14 Enlisted Radar Technicians completed 3 month AWG-10 Organization course.
- 15 Enlisted completed two weeks AWG-10 FAM course
- 3 Enlisted completed MOS Specialty School
- 5 Enlisted completed NBC School
- VMFA-251 received the Marine Air Group 32, Group Commanders Marksmanship Trophy on 8 January 1971 for requalifying 95.7% of personnel

d. Ordnance

The following is a list of munitions expended during the reporting period:

MK-45 A/C Flares  
 MK-106 Practice Bombs

74

61



|                          |      |
|--------------------------|------|
| AIM-9B Sidewinders       | 27   |
| A8II MK-4 Gun Pod Ammo   | 3983 |
| MK-76 Practice Bombs     | 1568 |
| 5.00" Zuni Rockets       | 149  |
| 2.75" Rockets            | 537  |
| 500 Lb. Bombs            | 175  |
| 1000 Lb. Bombs           | 12   |
| Mk-77 500 Lb. Fire Bombs | 25   |
| LAU 10 A/A               | 6    |
| AIM-7 Sparrows           | 24   |

e. Special Operations

During the period 10 February through 1 March 1971, VMFA-251 was deployed Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, for air to air and air to ground weapons training. For three days of the deployment, 15, 16, and 17 February, the squadron participated in a joint air to ground operation with the Second Marine Division entitled "Firex 71". VMFA-251 was a component of Provisional Marine Air Group Twenty and conducted 56 air to ground ordnance sorties in support of 2nd MAR DIV. All ordnance drops were under the control of a ground or airborne Forward Air Controller on the Vieques Air Impact Area located 18 miles east of Roosevelt Roads. For its role in the exercise, VMFA-251 was mentioned favorably in a communication from the Commanding General 2nd MAR DIV.

The remainder of the deployment was devoted to air to air missile firing. Aircrews were required to intercept, identify and then fire at a maneuvering, jet powered drone aircraft. Twenty four missiles, with deactivated warheads, were successfully fired in this environment, one of which scored a direct hit destroying the drone. Telemetering devices revealed that the remaining missiles passed near enough to the target to effect a kill.

On 7 April, the squadron hosted an air to ground weapons competition with VMA-331. The exercise was conducted at Putnam Target located 170 miles south of Beaufort. Although the attack pilots obtained better accuracy in their weapons deliveries, the fighter pilots of 251 flew a total of 40 sorties that day, accomplishing a total of 96 syllabus training credits.

From 14 April to 14 May 1971, five squadron aircraft were detached to NAS Key West, Florida, for operational alert duty. While only two aircraft were required to meet the alert commitment, the other three aircraft were used for advanced intercept training. The aircraft on alert duty were flown at least once daily in accordance with the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center's "scramble" procedures. While detached, these aircraft flew a total of 154 sorties in 30 days.

A second missile firing exercise was conducted 1 through 3 June 1971. A total of 29 sorties were flown and 27 AIM-9B Sidewinder missiles were successfully fired. These "heat-seeking" missiles were fired at air-dropped flares and the intercepts were accomplished under the control of Marine Air Control Squadron 9.

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f. Close Combat/Fire Support

Between 10 February and 1 March 1971 this squadron conducted 56 sorties during Firex 71. These sorties were airborne FAC controlled in simultaneous training operations with VMO-1 during deployment to NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

g. Civil Affairs

During the squadron's visit to NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, the Commanding Officer, LtCol "Rocky" Plant and technical information control officer, 1/LT R. E. Woernle were interviewed on a local television station. The program dealt with the ~~squadron's~~ history and present mission at Roosevelt Roads.

3. Narrative Summary of Events

VMFA-251 began the period under the command of LtCol R. Plant with sixteen aircraft assigned. We flew 2536.8 hours accomplishing 950 syllabus credits.

Four Naval Aviators, five Naval Flight Officers and nine enlisted men were transferred to West Pac.

The squadron accomplished one deployment to NS Roosevelt Roads participating in Firex 71 with the 2nd MAR DIV, and firing 24 AIM-7D Sparrow missiles.

On 8 March 1971, Major J. M. Mead took command of the squadron. Concurrently, Major R. J. Pederson assumed the duties of Executive Officer, Captain L. W. Stewart, Operations Officer, FltLt T. M. Bond, Aviation Safety Officer, Captain C. L. Culler, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, and SgtMaj L. Parent took over as the Sergeant Major.

Approximately one month later, the squadron competed with VMA-331 in air to ground ordnance delivery, followed the next day by a ten plane fly-by led by Brigadier General T. H. Miller. After the fly-by on 8 April, General Miller was the guest speaker at the squadron's mess night.

On 14 April, five aircraft were detached to NAS Key West for 30 days of operational alert duty. Just prior to this detachment, 10 April 1971, Major G. DeJong assumed the duties of Executive Officer. On 25 May, Major DeJong became the Aircraft Maintenance Officer and Major W. T. McFall took over as Executive Officer.

From 1-3 June, the squadron fired 27 AIM-9B Sidewinder missiles out of 29 attempts. Just prior to this missile shoot, 40 aircrews from the squadron attended a two week course in the operation of the AWG-10 airborne radar. This course led to the smooth transition from F-4B aircraft to F-4J aircraft, a transition which is still underway as this report is completed.

*J M Mead*  
J. M. MEAD



Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant  
Marine Corps Air Station  
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

S&C VMFA-251

LOG NO: 243-70

COPY NO: 103

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03B023570

28 August 1970

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32

Subj: Post Exercise Report

Ref: (a) VMFA-251 Op Order 2-70  
(b) GruO P3000.1B  
(c) VMFA-251 OpSum 1-70 through 11-70 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

Encl: (1) VMFA-251 Aviation Maintenance Officer Report  
(2) VMFA-251 S-4/Supply Report

1. General

a. In accordance with reference (a) and under the provisions outlined in reference (b) VMFA-251 conducted a squadron deployment to NS Roosevelt Roads during the period 23 July through 17 August 1970. Operational and Administrative control remained with Marine Aircraft Group 32.

2. Location and Meteorological Data.

a. With the exception of movement to and from the deployment area along with ferry flights, all operations were conducted within the Roosevelt Roads complexes. Of sixteen flying days, weather, combined with facilities, caused the cancellation of one day's operations and seriously hampered operations on another. Weather during the deployment period was insular in nature with cloud ceilings of from two to three thousand feet and from three tenths to six tenths coverage. During all of the sixteen flying days, rain was encountered. For the most part, rainfall was characterized by heavy tropical downpours of short duration followed by a rapid clearing. Runways would become well covered by water. Rainfall combined with high humidity and tropical temperatures (80°-90°) hampered maintenance and operations on a daily bases, not to mention attendant problems of human comfort. Hours of darkness were cooler with clearing skies and only scattered thunderstorm activity.

b. Weather was considered a factor from a maintenance standpoint in that daily rains caused continual problems with

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Enclosure (1)

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INTERVALS:  
12 YEARS  
10



NO 103  
NO 543-10  
58 WHTAC 1030  
032053230  
3380  
3:07K:474

Radar systems and AFCS components. High humidity and rain caused problems with communications equipment and rusted emergency egress systems components, causing a major maintenance effort in that regard.

c. Operationally, weather seriously hampered flights that were already limited due to lack of facilities at Roosevelt Roads. The Tacan Station went off line on 5 August and remained out of service for the duration of the deployment. This factor, coupled with a lack of any local IFR procedures or agreement and daily rainshowers, seriously hampered safe flight operations and greatly lessened the originally programmed schedule.

d. Considering the weather, some thought must be devoted to the construction of adequate shelter for aircraft especially those as electronically complex as an F4. It is recommended that shelters similar to those constructed at Da Nang AB, RVN, or Chu Lai AB, RVN, be constructed to reduce the deleterious effects of weather and provide a measure of protection for line maintenance.

### 3. Summary of Operations

a. As initially proposed, the deployment period was from 25 July through 16 August 1970. In order to efficiently utilize the tanker services of VMGR-252, movement was programmed on 23 July from MCAS Beaufort to NS Roosevelt Roads and on 17 August from NS Roosevelt Roads to MCAS Beaufort. These dates made the movement and air refueling of VMFA-251 coincident with the movements of VMFA-312 and VMFA-451. Flight operations in the deployment area were scheduled to commence on 26 July and terminate on 14 August. The deployment was divided into two phases; 26 July through 8 August for air to air training and 9 August through 14 August were to be devoted to air to ground weapons training. A missile Firex, utilizing both AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles was scheduled from 28 July through 4 August with 5-6 August as backup dates. In conjunction with the missile Firex, intensive ACM training was proposed in order to complete qualification in ACM phase for three Naval Aviators and five Radar Intercept Officers who could then qualify for Advanced Fighter Intercept credits during missile Firex against maneuvering BQM drones. Ten Naval Aviators and ten RIO's were previously qualified during intensive ACTM training at MCAS Beaufort and were scheduled AFI-9 (Maneuvering target, AIM-7) and AFI-10 (Maneuvering target, AIM-9). In addition, ten Naval Aviators and five RIO's were scheduled to complete FI-23 (AIM-7) and FI-24 (AIM-9). One Naval Aviator and three RIO's recently joined, were scheduled for Fighter Intercept phase training to increase their qualification.



b. The second, or air to ground phase involved all aircrews. Initially scheduled were two days of practice ordnance followed by three days of intensive live ordnance/CAS operations utilizing the services of VMO-1 controllers.

c. Prior to deployment, the squadron was notified that requested AIM-7E missiles were not available and that AIM-7D missiles would be substituted. The same was true in the case of requested AIM-9D missiles, with AIM-9B missiles provided as substitutes. The substituted AIM-7D's and AIM-9B's presented several problems. First, the AIM-7D missile is limited in scope with reference to maneuvering or ACM environment firing. This problem however, was overcome by well indoctrinated aircrews who were well versed in F4 Air Combat tactics, and intensive briefings regarding AIM-7D optimum launch zones. The AIM-9B substitute however, was a different problem. Since the AIM-9B is restricted from firing on the BQM-34 drone, this alone precluded the accomplishment of AFI-10 as a training objective. Additionally, there is no realistic target against which the AIM-9B can be fired. The TDU-22 is the recommended airborne target, but problems related to flare lite-off are so prevalent that the TDU is rendered virtually ineffective. Self contained flare exercises with the AIM-9B, outside of a "trigger-pull" exercise, are unrealistic and a waste of an expensive weapon. For these considerations, the AIM-9 portion of the Firex was cancelled. Available air to ground ordnance was also limited, the twenty-five Napalm tanks allotted were restricted from use by F4 aircraft. Additionally, the ordnance stock pile included the older-type Snake eye fins which have restrictions placed upon their use which seriously derogate CAS training. Snake eye fins were allowed for use in the retarded mode with inert weapons only.

d. During the movement to NS Roosevelt Roads, one aircraft and two aircrewmen were lost in an accident at Homestead AFB, Florida. The accident, and subsequent delays of aircrews who witnessed it along with a 2MAW stand-down on 28 July caused a loss of two days of scheduled flying. The aircrew killed in the accident were both ACM qualified and had been scheduled for AFI-9 credit. This reduced to nine the number of aircrews available for AFI-9 credit.

e. The air to air portion of the deployment commenced 29 July and was completed on 7 August. During that time, ten Firex periods were scheduled; three periods using BQM-34, seven periods utilizing the TDU-22A target, and two periods with the AQM-37. A total of 43 presentations were accomplished. Of that total, seven presentations on the first day were invalid due to a faulty



Luneberg Lens on the TDU. Subsequent investigation disclosed that a modification for surface to air missions, coupled with reversed installation rendered the Lens totally ineffective for air to air work. Two other presentations were invalid due to the TDU having been struck by a missile, damaging the lens to a degree that it was no longer reflective. Two other presentations were invalid when fighters were directed into a run after the TDU had been shot off by the lead aircraft. Two others were invalid when the runs were aborted by the controlling agency. Of the remaining thirty presentations, aircrews fired on or attempted to fire twenty-eight times. Nineteen missiles were actually fired and from an aircrew standpoint considered successful (see OpSum 10-70 Ref (c)). Of the remaining nine missiles, two were hangfire due to missile failure, one was hangfire due to AMCS failure. Four missiles were ejected without motor fire and the cause of the failure is undetermined. Two missiles, one hangfire and one ejection, were due to improper aircrew technique. Considering a total of thirty valid presentations and twenty-six attempts to fire during which aircrews met all parameters for firing, the squadron achieved an 80% firing to presentation record. Most noteworthy is that three BQM drones were shot down employing VID/ACM tactics. Four near misses (within kill radius) were recorded during the same exercise. Three TDU-22 targets were also hit and two near misses were recorded. From a missile reliability standpoint, it is worth note that only eight missiles are known to have functioned properly in every respect. The figure yields a missile reliability percentage for the AIM-7D of under 31%. Of the missiles delivered to the squadron, all had been reworked at least once and discrepancies such as defective EPU seals and EPU or HPU failures in flight were noted. TM analysis also showed one missile to be defective prior to fire and the run was aborted. In addition to the direct hits recorded miss distances of ten feet, twenty-two feet, sixteen feet, seventeen feet, eight feet, and twenty feet were recorded. Of these, several experienced fuzing failures or doubtful TM indications and were regarded as unsuccessful firings by FMSAEG.

f. Nine Naval Aviators and four Radar Intercept Officers were qualified on FI-23. Crew members were also qualified in VID work and Fighter Intercept flights. Of the targets utilized, the BQM was considered the most practical and realistic device. The squadron method of application was to utilize the BQM as a "graduation exercise" to amplify training in Air Combat tactics. The VID maneuver followed by an engagement against the maneuvering BQM provided aircrews with that portion of combat training not available in the ACM phase, i.e., switchology and firing of a

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missile while engaged in combat tactics. The exercise provided not only experience but motivation and instilled confidence in the F4 weapons system. The TDU-22A is of some value in the training of early stage aircrews, though much realism is lacking and the attendant problems of streaming, or tractor aircraft problems, cause much lost time and wasted sorties. The AQM-37A is not considered practical in any respect. During two periods scheduled the AQM experienced firing malfunction on the first period and aborted the mission. In the second period the AQM was successfully launched, however, due to range restrictions by AFWR it could only be fired on a southerly heading (away from the station). Since the AQM is not augmented to rear, controlling radar lost the AQM and was unable to direct the fighters to it. The AQM has limited useful flight time, is a "one shot" target, cannot maneuver and costs approximately \$17,000. These factors, weighed against a realistic, reusable, maneuvering BQM, which costs (unaugmented) approximately \$80,000 and can remain on station for about forty minutes clearly indicate that the BQM is the most cost-effective training device, far and away the most desirable from an aircrew standpoint.

g. Air to Ground training utilized the Agua Cay and Vieques targets. Due to limited facilities and weather only one night bombing flight was flown to evaluate the targets at night. It is felt that the Agua Cay target, though it can provide excellent data on each run, is not satisfactory for night bombing due to lack of any reference for visual flight. Vieques is only usable when lighted by a flare aircraft. During four days of air to ground weapons delivery sixty-four sorties were flown for a total of 64.5 hours.

h. For the entire deployment 147 sorties were accomplished out of 234 scheduled. A total of 172.2 hours were flown out of 291 scheduled. Total syllabus credits (x's) were 133. In addition to training sorties, movement to and from the deployment area, ferry flights, and test flights brought the total sorties to 212 and a total of 281 hours flown. Of the scheduled sorties, ten were lost due to weather, twenty were lost due to non availability of targets (tractor/A/C down) or cancellation of target by controlling agency. Attributable to Maintenance were forty-four sorties lost due to no available aircraft and thirteen sorties lost when aircraft went down and missions were ground aborted.

i. Support received by the squadron from various agencies was generally excellent. Controllers from MACS-9 assigned through 6 August were of considerable help providing control for



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early stage Fighter Intercept flights. The personnel from Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range, in particular CWO SMITH and WO TARVIN, USN, of Sea Range provided the maximum in support and placed the facilities of AFWR virtually at the Squadron's disposal. Their cooperation and willing spirit provided an atmosphere conducive to effective operation and successful employment. The entire Fleet Weapons Range staff was most helpful and aided this squadron materially in the conduct of the air to air exercise. The squadron was also provided with tapes and radio logs of all firing periods. VMO-1 provided excellent support during the air to ground phase. The benefits derived from this training by both squadrons are considerable. Special mention must be made of the outstanding support rendered by Major L. T. LASSETER and Capt. N. G. G. KERR of MAWTB. Their continued advice and assistance contributed greatly to a successful deployment. It is considered mandatory by this squadron, that the professional assistance offered by this group be utilized by every squadron to assure maximum effectiveness in all future training deployments.

j. Unfortunately, NS Roosevelt Roads was unable to provide the level of support so necessary to deployed squadrons. The Air Station is presently inadequate in providing services conducive to sustained operations. The lack of local instrument departures and recoveries limits all weather operations. The weather in Roosevelt Roads area makes such a capability imperative. Additionally, a failure of the Tacan Station on 5 August negated any operations in even marginal weather. The Tacan remained out of service for the remainder of the deployment. Conflict arose as well over ordnance procedures in the fuel pits. After numerous discrepancies in the Air Ops Manual were pointed out to Air Operations, many of the conflicts were resolved. Hot refuelling was in itself a problem and caused much delay because only Navy personnel were allowed to operate the pits and often they were late or not present. Minor problems arose when Air Operations refused to allow us to use our assigned tactical call and directed the use of Modex numbers. While not a particularly difficult problem, there was some confusion generated when their decision was reversed after we had used Modex numbers for two days.

k. Crew morale and well-being was hampered by NS Roosevelt Roads when the wearing of flight suits in the Wardroom of the BOQ was prohibited. The long distances involved in travel to and from BOQ areas to the flight line was then further complicated by the necessity to change clothes prior to and following each meal. This cut short mealtime and many aircrewmen merely avoided meals rather than undergo the extra effort involved. Such conditions are not conducive to safe flight. Oftsie General Mess and

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(Incl 9)



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(11) That investigation be made to determine the the Operations Building snack bar were still available, however, the Oftsie mess is some distance from the hanger area and the food at the Operations Building snack bar was greasy, poorly presented and generally considered unfit for consumption.

1. Recommendations:

(1) That deployments to NS Roosevelt Roads be limited to Air to Air work only and that air to ground operations be conducted at MCAS Yuma.

(2) That aircrews be thoroughly trained in ACM prior to air to air deployment.

(3) That the BQM-34 drone be utilized as the primary air to air target, such drones to be fully augmented and fully maneuverable.

(4) That the present stockpile of AIM-7D missiles be thoroughly re-evaluated from a standpoint of missile reliability and that AIM-7E missiles be made available for advanced missile exercises.

(5) That squadrons be provided the AIM-9D missile for use against the BQM or, that existing restrictions on AIM-9B's be lifted or re-evaluated.

(6) That the AQM be re-evaluated as an effective training device.

(7) That an effort be made by 2MAW to establish a level of self sufficiency with regard to target services, that such services be maintained in H&MS squadrons, and that they be deployed with the squadron. (TDU packs, etc.)

(8) That the VID/ACM exercise currently employed by the squadron be practiced and used as an adjunct to the ACM syllabus.

(9) That MAWTB assistance be provided all squadrons deployed for air to air work, and that missile exercises include a COMPEX.

(10) That present allocation of BQM-34 drones be increased to at least five per deployed squadron.

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## Recommendations:

- (11) That investigation be made to determine the feasibility of developing an air to air BQM capability at MCAS Cherry Point utilizing a zero length launcher.
- (12) That NS Roosevelt Roads develop or cause to be approved, local IFR procedures.
- (13) That deployments to NS Roosevelt Roads be limited to two weeks duration.

## 4. Munitions Expended

a. VMFA-251 expended the following ordnance:

### Air to Air

AIM-7D 23  
AIM-9B 0

## 6. Lessons Learned

### Air to Ground

| TYPE         | ALLOWED | USED | REMARKS                                 |
|--------------|---------|------|---|
| 5" ROCKET    | 108     | 106  |   |
| MK82 HE      | 65      | 62   |   |
| MK83 HE      | 6       | 6    |   |
| MK81 (INERT) | 12      | 6    | Used for display at open house.         |
| MK82 (INERT) | 30      | 24   |   |
| MK83 (INERT) | 3       | 0    |   |
| MK77         | 25      | 0    | Cannot be used on F4B                   |
| MK24         | 170     | 20   |   |
| MK76         | 450     | 65   | Unable to use due to A/C probs/wx NRR.  |
| 2.75"        | 500     | 55   | Weapons Dept had only 6 pods available. |

## 5. Personnel and Material

a. Personnel performance at NS Roosevelt Roads was excellent. It must be pointed out that the deployment was carried out with 12 aircraft, 47 Officers and 182 Enlisted. Normal T.O. is 327 men. Throughout the deployment morale and discipline remained high. Only one incident of disciplinary nature was recorded. There were no incidents involving civil authorities or civilians.

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b. A Squadron Open House on 14 August for dependants of NS Roosevelt Roads personnel was conducted. Squadron personnel devoted free time and effort to the preparation of what was said to be an entertaining and informative display. The effort was well received by all who attended and contributed to good inter-service relationships.

c. A rear echelon comprised of 9 Officers and 58 Enlisted remained at Beaufort to assist in Material, and administrative functions as well as provide needed Maintenance assistance.

d. On 23 July, 1stLT J. R. VANCE, and 1stLT D. K. HAGAMAN were killed in an aircraft accident at Homestead AFB, Florida. Rear echelon personnel provided casualty assistance and attended funeral services. Memorial services by the Squadron were held 27 July at NS Roosevelt Roads and on 19 August at MCAS Beaufort.


e. For Material Report see Encl (2).

#### 6. Lessons Learned

a. The weather during the Summer months at NS Roosevelt Roads will be a definite factor in air operations. At present the facilities at NS Roosevelt Roads are inadequate for weather operations and much time is lost due to facilities and weather.

b. Daily contact between Beaufort and Roosevelt Roads is a must. The most effective communication was by Autovon through Ramey AFB, P. R..

c. Mar Log flights are the lifeline of support, since AMD, NS Roosevelt Roads is incapable of providing support. It is imperative that adequate C-130 support be provided throughout the deployment.

  
R. O. LAWRENCE

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