

MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 251

Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant

Marine Corps Air Station

Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:DJK:dew

5750

5 January 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE (1))

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32
(2) Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: Command Chronology, 1 July 1970 through 31 December 1970

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.3A

(b) WgO 5750.1

(c) ASO 5750.1A

- Encl: (1) Post Exercise Report, NS Roosevelt Roads, P.R. (C) (Original Only)
(2) Corporal R. E. Edenfield receives Meritorious Promotion
(3) Captain J. T. Braton receives DFC
(4) VMFA-251 and VMA-324 On Dual Deployment
(5) VMFA-251 and VMA-324 Return Home
(6) VMFA-251 Change of Command
(7) Corporal Wells receives Air Medal
(8) Maintenance Control Gets It Done
(9) VMFA-251 Hosts Brownie Troop
(10) RAF Pilots Arrive, Join USAF Exchange Pilot
(11) VMFA-251 Tops The Mark
(12) General Axtell Presents Hanson Award, and CNO Safety Award to VMFA-251

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation/Location

Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron Two Five One, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902.

b. Period Covered

1 July 1970 through 31 December 1970.

S&C VMFA-251

LOG NO: 3-71

COPY NO: 1 of 5

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Command and Staff

Commanding Officer	LTCOL R. O. LAWRENCE	1 Jul - 31 Aug 70
	LTCOL R. PLANT	1 Sep - 31 Dec 70
Executive Officer	MAJOR R. G. KROPP	1 Jul - 18 Oct 70
	MAJOR M. G. WADSWORTH	19 Oct - 31 Dec 70
Operations Officer	MAJOR D. J. KIELY	1 Jul - 31 Dec 70
Administrative Officer	CWO W. J. ADDIS	1 Jul - 31 Aug 70
	1/LT R. DINKEL	1 Sep - 3 Nov 70
	CAPT R. E. DAHART	4 Nov - 31 Dec 70
Intelligence Officer	1/LT K. R. OEHM	1 Jul - 31 Dec 70
Logistics Officer	MAJOR A. C. HADLEY	1 Jul - 31 Dec 70
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	MAJOR T. J. LYMAN	1 Jul - 1 Sep 70
	CAPT M. D. VILLAREAL	1 Sep - 12 Oct 70
	MAJOR R. J. PEDERSON	13 Oct - 31 Dec 70
Flight Surgeon	LT D. L. TRITCH USN	1 Jul - 31 Dec 70
Sergeant Major	SGTMAJ J. E. WELSH	1 Jul - 31 Dec 70

d. Average Squadron Strength

<u>Month</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
JULY	56	240
AUGUST	54	227
SEPTEMBER	52	220
OCTOBER	58	237
NOVEMBER	57	247
DECEMBER	55	245

2. Sequence of Events

a. Personnel/Administration

During this reporting period, the following promotions were effected:

Fourteen Cpls promoted to Sgt
 Fifty-three LCpls promoted to Cpl
 Forty-one PFCs promoted to LCpl
 Four Pvts promoted to PFC

During the period, twenty-four awards were presented to squadron personnel for actions while members of FMFPAC units.

The Bronze Star Medal was awarded to 1/LT P. J. LOWERY for service in the Republic of Viet Nam.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 29614

In addition, the following awards were presented to Squadron Personnel:

- 5 - Air Medals
- 3 - Navy Commendation w/Combat "V"
- 14 - Navy Achievement w/Combat "V"
- 1 - Purple Heart Medal

b. Intelligence

Throughout the reporting period, the Intelligence Section fulfilled ground training requirements for both Intelligence personnel as well as aircrews.

Extensive Air Intelligence Briefs were conducted on Viet Nam, Laos, Cuba and Capabilities and operations of USSR and Soviet Bloc Air Forces.

c. Training/NBC

During the reporting period, 84 hours were devoted to the conduct of Basic Training. In addition, aircrews were assigned to various schools as follows:

- 20 - Air Combat Tactical Maneuvering Course
- 19 - Tactical Conventional Weapons Delivery Course
- 3 - Survival Escape and Evasion Course
- 1 - Ordnance School
- 7 - F4J Cross Training
- 6 - Assigned Various "B" Schools
- 5 - Sent To NBC School

The squadron also conducted a Gas Chamber drill for all personnel on 23 September 1970.

d. Special Operations

On 23 July through 17 August 1970 the squadron deployed to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico for intensive Air to Air and Air to Ground training. The period 25 July through 8 August was devoted to an AIM-7 Phase II and Phase III Firex. An Air to Air Complex was conducted by MAWTB personnel.

e. Close Combat/Fire Support

None Conducted during this period.

f. Logistics

23 July - 17 August 1970 Squadron movement to and from NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

1 - BATTLE READY REPORT
17 - BATTLE VOUCHER/REPORT A/COUNTDOWN "A"
2 - BATTLE COMMUNICATIONS A/COUNTDOWN "A"
3 - VFL REPORT

g. Close Air Support

During the period VMFA-251 provided Close Air Support for AO School, Second Marine Division and Second ANGLICO, as well as simultaneous training operations with VMO-1 during deployment to NS Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

h. Civil Affairs

During the reporting period, VMFA-251 hosted a local childrens group and a group of Junior NROTC Cadets from the state of Florida.

On 14 August 1970, a squadron "Open House" was conducted for personnel and dependents of NS Roosevelt Roads. Static displays of aircraft and weapons, guided tours by squadron personnel and free refreshments helped to familiarize personnel from the Roosevelt Roads area with the equipment and mission of a Marine squadron.

On 9 November 1970, Brownie Troop 423, from the Beaufort area was hosted by the squadron. Lectures, a guided tour, static displays and refreshments completed the program.

On 3 December 1970, Junior NROTC Cadets from the Florida area were given a tour of squadron facilities, lectures by squadron personnel, provided with static displays and demonstrations to stimulate interest in military aviation and to increase their knowledge of the mission and equipment in a Marine Corps squadron.

3. Narrative Summary of Events

VMFA-251 commenced the period under the command of LTCOL R. O. LAWRENCE. Assigned to the squadron were 18 F4B aircraft with 18 on hand.

During the period, the squadron flew a total of 2008 flight hours, accumulating a 886 syllabus credits. Most noteworthy is the fact that, throughout the period squadron operations were conducted without the use of external wing tanks. This practice greatly improves mission flexibility, reduces aircraft "turn-around" time, increases the sortie rate and results in greatly increased return in training accomplished for each training dollar. The increase in aircrew effectiveness through continued training in Air Combat Maneuvering is the most significant benefit derived from such a configuration. Lessened requirements for replacement aircrews in WestPac resulted in the transfer of only six aircrewmembers to 1st MAW units during the period. The increased training time available to squadron members allowed the squadron to progress to Phase III training, appreciably increasing aircrew capabilities and squadron readiness.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

In July 1970, the squadron commenced an intensive program to qualify aircrews in Aerial Combat Maneuvering. The services of Major L. T. Lasseter, Captains N. G. Kerr, W. P. Lepore and J. D. Cummings of MAWTB, MCAS Cherry Point, proved invaluable in the accomplishment of squadron training and prepared the squadron for Phase III Air to Air missile firing planned for deployment in late July and August.

On 23 July 1970, the squadron deployed to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. An unfortunate accident during the move to Roosevelt Roads, took the lives of 1/LT J. R. Vance and 1/LT D. K. Hagaman, whose aircraft crashed while attempting to land at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.

Commencing deployment operations on 27 July 1970 VMFA-251 successfully completed two weeks of Phase II and Phase III Air to Air missile firing and one week of Air to Ground weapons. A total of 198 sorties amounting to 240 hours were flown. A total of 130 syllabus credits were recorded. Most noteworthy was the employment of a realistic and highly demanding exercise against a fully maneuverable BQM-34 drone target. The exercise was patterned after that utilized by the "Top Gun" School at NAS Miramar, California, as a "Graduation" exercise. Extensive preparation for the exercise, which demanded a high level of proficiency in Air Combat Tactics as well as a thorough knowledge of the F4 weapons system, yielded outstanding results. Ten aircrews were Phase III qualified as they scored direct hits on three of the elusive drones along with six other "killing" hits. A total of 28 missiles were fired during both Phase II and Phase III training. During a Complex conducted by MAWTB the squadron earned 27 "E" awards for excellence in Air to Air employment. Returning to Beaufort on 17 August, the squadron continued to conduct Intercept, Air to Ground and ACM training.

On 1 September 1970, during dual change of command ceremonies, LTCOL Robert Plant was relieved of his duties as Commanding Officer, H&MS-32, and in turn relieved LTCOL Rodney O. Lawrence as Commanding Officer, VMFA-251.


On 30 September 1970, while engaged in Air Combat Tactics, Major V. P. Nolan and 1/LT M. K. Kilpatrick were killed when a portion of the wing of their F4B fighter separated from the aircraft. Major Nolan was a member of MAWTB, MCAS Cherry Point, N.C. on temporary duty with VMFA-251 as an Aerial Combat Maneuvering instructor.

On 2 October 1970, Major General G. C. Axtell, CG 2nd MAW presented VMFA-251 with the FMFLant Safety Award in recognition of over 29,000 accident free flight hours.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 29614

In November 1970, the squadron was informed that it had been selected to receive the Robert M. Hanson award as the foremost fighter squadron in the Marine Corps. Major General G. C. Axtell presented the Hanson Trophy, along with the CNO Safety Award, to the squadron on 8 December 1970.


R. PLANT

3121
15 March 1971

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following (b) report (c) and attached concerning the deployment of F-4E to the

2. The basic objectives of the deployment are to

3. The basic objectives of the deployment are to

4. The basic objectives of the deployment are to

5. The basic objectives of the deployment are to

6. The basic objectives of the deployment are to

Copy 101 02 20 100 (ATTN: G-2)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant
Marine Corps Air Station
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

S&C VMFA-251

LOG NO: 243-70

COPY NO: 103

3:DJK:tjw

3760

03B023570

28 August 1970

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32

Subj: Post Exercise Report

Ref: (a) VMFA-251 Op Order 2-70
(b) GruO P3000.1B
(c) VMFA-251 OpSum 1-70 through 11-70 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

Encl: (1) VMFA-251 Aviation Maintenance Officer Report
(2) VMFA-251 S-4/Supply Report

1. General

a. In accordance with reference (a) and under the provisions outlined in reference (b) VMFA-251 conducted a squadron deployment to NS Roosevelt Roads during the period 23 July through 17 August 1970. Operational and Administrative control remained with Marine Aircraft Group 32.

2. Location and Meteorological Data.

a. With the exception of movement to and from the deployment area along with ferry flights, all operations were conducted within the Roosevelt Roads complexes. Of sixteen flying days, weather, combined with facilities, caused the cancellation of one day's operations and seriously hampered operations on another. Weather during the deployment period was insular in nature with cloud ceilings of from two to three thousand feet and from three tenths to six tenths coverage. During all of the sixteen flying days, rain was encountered. For the most part, rainfall was characterized by heavy tropical downpours of short duration followed by a rapid clearing. Runways would become well covered by water. Rainfall combined with high humidity and tropical temperatures (80°-90°) hampered maintenance and operations on a daily bases, not to mention attendant problems of human comfort. Hours of darkness were cooler with clearing skies and only scattered thunderstorm activity.

b. Weather was considered a factor from a maintenance standpoint in that daily rains caused continual problems with

S & C MAG 32

Enclosure (1)

LOG NO. 1207...70

COPY NO. 1...OF 2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

INTERVALS:

12 YEARS

10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(encl (9))

58 WHTAC 1030
032053230
3380
3:07K:474

Radar systems and AFCS components. High humidity and rain caused problems with communications equipment and rusted emergency egress systems components, causing a major maintenance effort in that regard.

c. Operationally, weather seriously hampered flights that were already limited due to lack of facilities at Roosevelt Roads. The Tacan Station went off line on 5 August and remained out of service for the duration of the deployment. This factor, coupled with a lack of any local IFR procedures or agreement and daily rainshowers, seriously hampered safe flight operations and greatly lessened the originally programmed schedule.

d. Considering the weather, some thought must be devoted to the construction of adequate shelter for aircraft especially those as electronically complex as an F4. It is recommended that shelters similar to those constructed at Da Nang AB, RVN, or Chu Lai AB, RVN, be constructed to reduce the deleterious effects of weather and provide a measure of protection for line maintenance.

3. Summary of Operations

a. As initially proposed, the deployment period was from 25 July through 16 August 1970. In order to efficiently utilize the tanker services of VMGR-252, movement was programmed on 23 July from MCAS Beaufort to NS Roosevelt Roads and on 17 August from NS Roosevelt Roads to MCAS Beaufort. These dates made the movement and air refueling of VMFA-251 coincident with the movements of VMFA-312 and VMFA-451. Flight operations in the deployment area were scheduled to commence on 26 July and terminate on 14 August. The deployment was divided into two phases; 26 July through 8 August for air to air training and 9 August through 14 August were to be devoted to air to ground weapons training. A missile Firex, utilizing both AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles was scheduled from 28 July through 4 August with 5-6 August as backup dates. In conjunction with the missile Firex, intensive ACM training was proposed in order to complete qualification in ACM phase for three Naval Aviators and five Radar Intercept Officers who could then qualify for Advanced Fighter Intercept credits during missile Firex against maneuvering BQM drones. Ten Naval Aviators and ten RIO's were previously qualified during intensive ACTM training at MCAS Beaufort and were scheduled AFI-9 (Maneuvering target, AIM-7) and AFI-10 (Maneuvering target, AIM-9). In addition, ten Naval Aviators and five RIO's were scheduled to complete FI-23 (AIM-7) and FI-24 (AIM-9). One Naval Aviator and three RIO's recently joined, were scheduled for Fighter Intercept phase training to increase their qualification.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED

b. The second, or air to ground phase involved all aircrews. Initially scheduled were two days of practice ordnance followed by three days of intensive live ordnance/CAS operations utilizing the services of VMO-1 controllers.

c. Prior to deployment, the squadron was notified that requested AIM-7E missiles were not available and that AIM-7D missiles would be substituted. The same was true in the case of requested AIM-9D missiles, with AIM-9B missiles provided as substitutes. The substituted AIM-7D's and AIM-9B's presented several problems. First, the AIM-7D missile is limited in scope with reference to maneuvering or ACM environment firing. This problem however, was overcome by well indoctrinated aircrews who were well versed in F4 Air Combat tactics, and intensive briefings regarding AIM-7D optimum launch zones. The AIM-9B substitute however, was a different problem. Since the AIM-9B is restricted from firing on the BQM-34 drone, this alone precluded the accomplishment of AFI-10 as a training objective. Additionally, there is no realistic target against which the AIM-9B can be fired. The TDU-22 is the recommended airborne target, but problems related to flare lite-off are so prevalent that the TDU is rendered virtually ineffective. Self contained flare exercises with the AIM-9B, outside of a "trigger-pull" exercise, are unrealistic and a waste of an expensive weapon. For these considerations, the AIM-9 portion of the Firex was cancelled. Available air to ground ordnance was also limited, the twenty-five Napalm tanks allotted were restricted from use by F4 aircraft. Additionally, the ordnance stock pile included the older-type Snake eye fins which have restrictions placed upon their use which seriously derogate CAS training. Snake eye fins were allowed for use in the retarded mode with inert weapons only.

d. During the movement to NS Roosevelt Roads, one aircraft and two aircrewmen were lost in an accident at Homestead AFB, Florida. The accident, and subsequent delays of aircrews who witnessed it along with a 2MAW stand-down on 28 July caused a loss of two days of scheduled flying. The aircrew killed in the accident were both ACM qualified and had been scheduled for AFI-9 credit. This reduced to nine the number of aircrews available for AFI-9 credit.

e. The air to air portion of the deployment commenced 29 July and was completed on 7 August. During that time, ten Firex periods were scheduled; three periods using BQM-34, seven periods utilizing the TDU-22A target, and two periods with the AQM-37. A total of 43 presentations were accomplished. Of that total, seven presentations on the first day were invalid due to a faulty

Luneberg Lens on the TDU. Subsequent investigation disclosed that a modification for surface to air missions, coupled with reversed installation rendered the Lens totally ineffective for air to air work. Two other presentations were invalid due to the TDU having been struck by a missile, damaging the lens to a degree that it was no longer reflective. Two other presentations were invalid when fighters were directed into a run after the TDU had been shot off by the lead aircraft. Two others were invalid when the runs were aborted by the controlling agency. Of the remaining thirty presentations, aircrews fired on or attempted to fire twenty-eight times. Nineteen missiles were actually fired and from an aircrew standpoint considered successful (see OpSum 10-70 Ref (c)). Of the remaining nine missiles, two were hangfire due to missile failure, one was hangfire due to AMCS failure. Four missiles were ejected without motor fire and the cause of the failure is undetermined. Two missiles, one hangfire and one ejection, were due to improper aircrew technique. Considering a total of thirty valid presentations and twenty-six attempts to fire during which aircrews met all parameters for firing, the squadron achieved an 80% firing to presentation record. Most noteworthy is that three BQM drones were shot down employing VID/ACM tactics. Four near misses (within kill radius) were recorded during the same exercise. Three TDU-22 targets were also hit and two near misses were recorded. From a missile reliability standpoint, it is worth note that only eight missiles are known to have functioned properly in every respect. The figure yields a missile reliability percentage for the AIM-7D of under 31%. Of the missiles delivered to the squadron, all had been reworked at least once and discrepancies such as defective EPU seals and EPU or HPU failures in flight were noted. TM analysis also showed one missile to be defective prior to fire and the run was aborted. In addition to the direct hits recorded miss distances of ten feet, twenty-two feet, sixteen feet, seventeen feet, eight feet, and twenty feet were recorded. Of these, several experienced fuzing failures or doubtful TM indications and were regarded as unsuccessful firings by FMSAEG.

f. Nine Naval Aviators and four Radar Intercept Officers were qualified on FI-23. Crew members were also qualified in VID work and Fighter Intercept flights. Of the targets utilized, the BQM was considered the most practical and realistic device. The squadron method of application was to utilize the BQM as a "graduation exercise" to amplify training in Air Combat tactics. The VID maneuver followed by an engagement against the maneuvering BQM provided aircrews with that portion of combat training not available in the ACM phase, i.e., switchology and firing of a

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED

28 August 1970

missile while engaged in combat tactics. The exercise provided not only experience but motivation and instilled confidence in the F4 weapons system. The TDU-22A is of some value in the training of early stage aircrews, though much realism is lacking and the attendant problems of streaming, or tractor aircraft problems, cause much lost time and wasted sorties. The AQM-37A is not considered practical in any respect. During two periods scheduled the AQM experienced firing malfunction on the first period and aborted the mission. In the second period the AQM was successfully launched, however, due to range restrictions by AFWR it could only be fired on a southerly heading (away from the station). Since the AQM is not augmented to rear, controlling radar lost the AQM and was unable to direct the fighters to it. The AQM has limited useful flight time, is a "one shot" target, cannot maneuver and costs approximately \$17,000. These factors, weighed against a realistic, reusable, maneuvering BQM, which costs (unaugmented) approximately \$80,000 and can remain on station for about forty minutes clearly indicate that the BQM is the most cost-effective training device, far and away the most desirable from an aircrew standpoint.

g. Air to Ground training utilized the Agua Cay and Vieques targets. Due to limited facilities and weather only one night bombing flight was flown to evaluate the targets at night. It is felt that the Agua Cay target, though it can provide excellent data on each run, is not satisfactory for night bombing due to lack of any reference for visual flight. Vieques is only usable when lighted by a flare aircraft. During four days of air to ground weapons delivery sixty-four sorties were flown for a total of 64.5 hours.

h. For the entire deployment 147 sorties were accomplished out of 234 scheduled. A total of 172.2 hours were flown out of 291 scheduled. Total syllabus credits (x's) were 133. In addition to training sorties, movement to and from the deployment area, ferry flights, and test flights brought the total sorties to 212 and a total of 281 hours flown. Of the scheduled sorties, ten were lost due to weather, twenty were lost due to non availability of targets (tractor/A/C down) or cancellation of target by controlling agency. Attributable to Maintenance were forty-four sorties lost due to no available aircraft and thirteen sorties lost when aircraft went down and missions were ground aborted.

i. Support received by the squadron from various agencies was generally excellent. Controllers from MACS-9 assigned through 6 August were of considerable help providing control for

28 August 1970

early stage Fighter Intercept flights. The personnel from Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range, in particular CWO SMITH and WO TARVIN, USN, of Sea Range provided the maximum in support and placed the facilities of AFWR virtually at the Squadron's disposal. Their cooperation and willing spirit provided an atmosphere conducive to effective operation and successful employment. The entire Fleet Weapons Range staff was most helpful and aided this squadron materially in the conduct of the air to air exercise. The squadron was also provided with tapes and radio logs of all firing periods. VMO-1 provided excellent support during the air to ground phase. The benefits derived from this training by both squadrons are considerable. Special mention must be made of the outstanding support rendered by Major L. T. LASSETER and Capt. N. G. G. KERR of MAWTB. Their continued advice and assistance contributed greatly to a successful deployment. It is considered mandatory by this squadron, that the professional assistance offered by this group be utilized by every squadron to assure maximum effectiveness in all future training deployments.

j. Unfortunately, NS Roosevelt Roads was unable to provide the level of support so necessary to deployed squadrons. The Air Station is presently inadequate in providing services conducive to sustained operations. The lack of local instrument departures and recoveries limits all weather operations. The weather in Roosevelt Roads area makes such a capability imperative. Additionally, a failure of the Tacan Station on 5 August negated any operations in even marginal weather. The Tacan remained out of service for the remainder of the deployment. Conflict arose as well over ordnance procedures in the fuel pits. After numerous discrepancies in the Air Ops Manual were pointed out to Air Operations, many of the conflicts were resolved. Hot refuelling was in itself a problem and caused much delay because only Navy personnel were allowed to operate the pits and often they were late or not present. Minor problems arose when Air Operations refused to allow us to use our assigned tactical call and directed the use of Modex numbers. While not a particularly difficult problem, there was some confusion generated when their decision was reversed after we had used Modex numbers for two days.

k. Crew morale and well-being was hampered by NS Roosevelt Roads when the wearing of flight suits in the Wardroom of the BOQ was prohibited. The long distances involved in travel to and from BOQ areas to the flight line was then further complicated by the necessity to change clothes prior to and following each meal. This cut short mealtime and many aircrewmen merely avoided meals rather than undergo the extra effort involved. Such conditions are not conducive to safe flight. Oftsie General Mess and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Incl (9))

28 August 1970

(11) That investigation be made to determine the the Operations Building snack bar were still available, however, the Oftsie mess is some distance from the hanger area and the food at the Operations Building snack bar was greasy, poorly presented and generally considered unfit for consumption.

1. Recommendations:

(1) That deployments to NS Roosevelt Roads be limited to Air to Air work only and that air to ground operations be conducted at MCAS Yuma.

(2) That aircrews be thoroughly trained in ACM prior to air to air deployment.

(3) That the BQM-34 drone be utilized as the primary air to air target, such drones to be fully augmented and fully maneuverable.

(4) That the present stockpile of AIM-7D missiles be thoroughly re-evaluated from a standpoint of missile reliability and that AIM-7E missiles be made available for advanced missile exercises.

(5) That squadrons be provided the AIM-9D missile for use against the BQM or, that existing restrictions on AIM-9B's be lifted or re-evaluated.

(6) That the AQM be re-evaluated as an effective training device.

(7) That an effort be made by 2MAW to establish a level of self sufficiency with regard to target services, that such services be maintained in H&MS squadrons, and that they be deployed with the squadron. (TDU packs, etc.)

(8) That the VID/ACM exercise currently employed by the squadron be practiced and used as an adjunct to the ACM syllabus.

(9) That MAWTB assistance be provided all squadrons deployed for air to air work, and that missile exercises include a COMPEX.

(10) That present allocation of BQM-34 drones be increased to at least five per deployed squadron.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recommendations:

- (11) That investigation be made to determine the feasibility of developing an air to air BQM capability at MCAS Cherry Point utilizing a zero length launcher.
- (12) That NS Roosevelt Roads develop or cause to be approved, local IFR procedures.
- (13) That deployments to NS Roosevelt Roads be limited to two weeks duration.

4. Munitions Expended

a. VMFA-251 expended the following ordnance:

Air to Air

AIM-7D 23
AIM-9B 0

6. Lessons Learned

Air to Ground

TYPE	ALLOWED	USED	REMARKS
5" ROCKET	108	106	
MK82 HE	65	62	
MK83 HE	6	6	
MK81 (INERT)	12	6	Used for display at open house.
MK82 (INERT)	30	24	
MK83 (INERT)	3	0	
MK77	25	0	Cannot be used on F4B
MK24	170	20	
MK76	450	65	Unable to use due to A/C probs/wx NRR.
2.75"	500	55	Weapons Dept had only 6 pods available.

5. Personnel and Material

a. Personnel performance at NS Roosevelt Roads was excellent. It must be pointed out that the deployment was carried out with 12 aircraft, 47 Officers and 182 Enlisted. Normal T.O. is 327 men. Throughout the deployment morale and discipline remained high. Only one incident of disciplinary nature was recorded. There were no incidents involving civil authorities or civilians.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. A Squadron Open House on 14 August for dependants of NS Roosevelt Roads personnel was conducted. Squadron personnel devoted free time and effort to the preparation of what was said to be an entertaining and informative display. The effort was well received by all who attended and contributed to good inter-service relationships.

c. A rear echelon comprised of 9 Officers and 58 Enlisted remained at Beaufort to assist in Material, and administrative functions as well as provide needed Maintenance assistance.

d. On 23 July, 1stLT J. R. VANCE, and 1stLT D. K. HAGAMAN were killed in an aircraft accident at Homestead AFB, Florida. Rear echelon personnel provided casualty assistance and attended funeral services. Memorial services by the Squadron were held 27 July at NS Roosevelt Roads and on 19 August at MCAS Beaufort.


e. For Material Report see Encl (2).

6. Lessons Learned

a. The weather during the Summer months at NS Roosevelt Roads will be a definite factor in air operations. At present the facilities at NS Roosevelt Roads are inadequate for weather operations and much time is lost due to facilities and weather.

b. Daily contact between Beaufort and Roosevelt Roads is a must. The most effective communication was by Autovon through Ramey AFB, P. R..

c. Mar Log flights are the lifeline of support, since AMD, NS Roosevelt Roads is incapable of providing support. It is imperative that adequate C-130 support be provided throughout the deployment.


R. O. LAWRENCE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 29614

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~