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03M04667

15 February 1967

2dMAW S&C FILES  
No. 04297-B-67  
Copy No. 1 of 2

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, VMFA-251 ltr 1:MOR:fam of 25 January 1967

From: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic  
Subj: Command Chronology

1. Readdressed and Forwarded.

2. This endorsement may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when removed from the basic letter.

*V. J. Gottschalk*  
V. J. GOTTSCHALK  
Chief of Staff

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DOWNGRADED AT 8 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10  
(GROUP 4)

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Jul-Dec 66



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HEADQUARTERS  
Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2dMAW, FMFLant  
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina, 29902

5750  
03A03367  
2 February 1967

2dMAW S&C FILES  
No. 04297-A-67  
Copy No. 1 of 3

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, VMFA-251 ltr 1:MOR:fam of 25 January 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology

1. Forwarded.

*G. J. Collins*  
G. J. COLLINS

Copy to: CO, VMFA-251

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MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 251  
Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing FMFLANT  
Marine Corps Air Station  
Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

1:MOR:fam

2dMAW S&C FILE  
No. 04297-27  
Copy No. 1 of 3

25 January 1967

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer MAG-32  
(2) Commanding General 2d Marine Air Wing  
(3) Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Atlantic

~~S&C VMFA-251~~

~~LOG NO: 35-66~~

~~COPY NO: 1 OF 5~~

080832

Subj: VMFA-251 Command Chronology period 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) WGO 5750.2  
(c) CG 2d MAW 191940Z Jan67

Encl: (1) Synopsis of sequential listing of significant events, VMFA-251 period 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966.  
(2) VMFA-251 Organizational Data, period 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966.  
(3) Sequential listing of significant events period 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966.

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), VMFA-251 Command Chronology for the period of 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966 is submitted.

2. Enclosures (1) through (3) contain the information and documentation as required.

*L. R. Hawkins*  
L. R. HAWKINS

Downgraded at three year intervals;  
Declassified after twelve years;  
DOD Dir 5200.10.

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S&C MAG 32

LOG NO. 172-67

COPY NO. 1 of 4

HISTORICAL  
MARINE CORPS

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RECEIVED: 2014 OCT 07 10 50 AM  
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION  
BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA

Synopsis of Sequential Listing of Significant Events, VMFA-251, Period 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1966.

1. The following is a synopsis of those significant events listed in enclosure (3). No attempt has been made to include the many and varied minor commitments executed during this period.
  - a. VMFA-251 entered fiscal year 1967 under the command of LtCol G. H. Keller, and was based at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina. The main functions of the Squadron during this reporting period were to provide air crews and men the necessary experience to fully qualify them for overseas duty in a combat environment. In rough terms aircrews achieve this ready status within seven to eight months time in the Squadron. Of their combat training about 60 % is devoted to air to air tactics and the remainder is used in perfecting air to ground ordnance delivery technique. The Squadron ensured that this all around training provided versatile and experienced air crews to other Marine squadrons deployed overseas.
  - b. The July 7th Open House held by VMFA-251 was attended by many of the Squadron members' dependents. On hand to welcome the guests was the Commanding Officer, LtCol G. H. Keller. During their tour of the Squadron area the dependents were shown various demonstrations and movies concerning the F4B "Phantom" jet.
  - c. During a formal ceremony on July 14th the Air Station Commanding Officer, Colonel J. L. Warren presented the rotating ground safety plaque to VMFA-251. The plaque is presented monthly to the Squadron which sets the lowest ground accident rate per man during that month. VMFA-251 had won the plaque on four previous months giving them the best ground safety record for the fiscal year.
  - d. September 6-19 saw VMFA-251 deployed to Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona for practice in technique of air-to-ground ordnance delivery. Average aircrew readiness was increased significantly, and the deployment was considered an overall success.
  - e. October 6th brought a Royal Air Force pilot to VMFA-251. Flight Lieutenant Christopher Carr-White, a graduate of the Royal Air Force Academy, was assigned to the Squadron as assistant Operations Officer, and Squadron pilot. He is believed to be the first British Officer to serve at this base in the exchange program.
  - f. On November 18th, VMFA-251 witnessed a colorful Change of Command Ceremony. The outgoing skipper, LtCol G. H. Keller, presented the Squadron Colors to the new Commanding Officer, Major L. R. Hawkins. Ceremonies included selections played by the Parris Island Drum and Bugle Corps, and an address by Colonel L. H. Steman, Marine Aircraft Group 32's Commanding Officer.

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(3) No attempt has been made to include the data and related information  
 The following is a synopsis of those significant events listed in enclosure

Date 31 December 1966

g. From 26 November to 16 December, VMFA-251 went on its second deployment of the reporting period. Arriving at Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, the Squadron immediately began work on its three preplanned tasks. The first of these was Project Sparrow Shoot in which the Squadron conducted test firings of the Sparrow missile. Next came the Squadron's participation in IANTFLEX 66 as ~~participation in IANTFLEX 66~~ as both friendly and aggressor air in a variety of missions. The third task was to accomplish as much normal syllabus training as possible. In all three missions the Squadron was very successful.

3. Synopsis of Deployment Activities and Staff Assignments

4. Staff Assignments

ALIAS	NAME/NAME	PERIOD
VMFA-251 XO	MAJ. C. L. BATTISTONE	1Jul-7Aug66
	MAJ. L. R. HAWKINS	8Aug-18Nov66
	MAJ. C. L. BATTISTONE	19Nov-31Dec66
S-1	1stLt R. L. BRUTER	1Jul-15Aug66
	CAPT J. R. SPENCER	16Aug-31Dec66
S-2	1stLt S. R. TOMLINSON, JR	1Jul-11Oct66
	1stLt S. L. BENSON	12Oct-31Dec66
S-3	CAPT C. S. ESTERLINE	1Jul-7Aug66
	MAJ. C. L. BATTISTONE	8Aug-18Nov66
	MAJ. P. G. BOCKMAN	19Nov-31Dec66
S-4	CAPT M. W. MEREDITH	1Jul-31Dec66
Maintenance Officer	MAJ. A. R. RIBBECK, JR	1Jul-31Dec66
First Sergeant	1stSGT D. L. KAYON	1Jul-5Aug66
	1stSGT P. L. BUTLER	6Aug-31Dec66

5. Average monthly strength during reporting period.

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
SA	20	19*				
MSO	17	17				
AS	5	9				
SSO	224	226	228	214	214	209

\* Includes Flight Lieutenant Carr-White R.A.P.

Enclosure (1)

Enclosure (2)

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IDENTIFICATION

10 DEC 1966  
DEL: OIV24200  
3000  
TIC: 1247

ADMINISTRATION

A. Squadron Strength  
33 Marine Officers

VMFA-251 LANTFLEX-66 POST EXERCISE REPORT

On 27 November 1966, VMFA-251 (rein) deployed to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico to participate in LANTFLEX-66 as a part of Provisional Marine Aircraft Group Twenty. The post-exercise report which follows is concerned primarily with the period 6 through 9 December when this squadron supported the amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore. Only brief mention is made of the period 4 and 5 December when VMFA-251 flew a total of 22 sorties in support of Orange Air Forces under CTG 24.3.

2. The aircraft strength would have been a limiting factor in this exercise had the squadron been more heavily committed to sustained operations. Although the F-4 is 26 pilots/26 RIO's and the F-105 is 21 pilots/21 RIO's, this squadron has only 17 pilots and 17 RIO's assigned, of which 17 pilots and 11 RIO's participated in the exercise.

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I. S-1 ADMINISTRATION

A. Squadron Strength

1. Summary 33 Marine Officers

1 Navy Officer (Flight Surgeon)

1 EAF Officer (Exchange Pilot)

The biggest problem was in the area of flight crew debriefings. These were conducted after every hop by 177 VMFA-251 Enlisted personnel. Valuable training was gained by 17 Enlisted attached from H&MS-32 also by the flight crews themselves. 48 Enlisted attached from MABS-32 active and concise manner. The information 3 Enlisted attached from MWSG-27 was plotted on area maps and condensed 1 Enlisted attached from MAG-31 summary submitted to PROVNAF-20 3 Navy Enlisted attached from MABS-32

Flight Totals: 35 Officers initiated in the use of authenticators and situation reports 249 Enlisted of the problem. Situation maps of the 16th MEB scheme of maneuver were kept for this purpose.

B. The Pilot/RIO strength could have become a limiting factor in this exercise had the squadron been more heavily committed to sustained day and night operations. Although the T. O. is 26 Pilots/26 RIO's and Manning level is 21 Pilots/21RIO's, this squadron has only 17 Pilots and 13 RIO's assigned, of which 17 Pilots and 11 RIO's participated in the exercise.

Overall the exercise from the intelligence standpoint was valuable to all concerned. Enlisted personnel, especially, gained experience in the fundamentals of gleanng essential information from the debriefing of the flight crews and translating this to a visual map form.

B. Comments and Recommendation

Item: Feedback of Intelligence Information

Comment: After an amphibious landing, frequent intelligence summaries giving the state of battle and position of enemy and friendly forces is of great value to the air unit participating in support of the landing assault and subsequent battle. It enables pilots engaged in CAS missions to have a background of information regarding the approximate position and strength of the enemy ground forces. This knowledge makes subsequent airborne briefing by the FAC on CAS strikes more realistic and is of great training value to pilots on exercises. During LANTFLEX no significant information was disseminated.

Recommendation: The problem as an effective

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the summaries be built into the progress of the operation.

Enclosure ( / )  
Enclosure ( / )



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1. VVA. OLLYCAL (EXPOSURE 1110P)

III. S-1 Operations  
II. S-2 INTELLIGENCE

A. Summary of Activities

The biggest project undertaken in the squadron Intelligence Section was in the area of flight crew debriefings. These were conducted after every hop by squadron intelligence personnel. Valuable training was gained by not only intelligence personnel but also by the flight crews themselves on reporting occurrences in an objective and concise manner. The information received from these debriefings was plotted on area maps and condensed into a twice daily intelligence summary submitted to PROVMA-20 along with one sortie per day for the C-117 from 6 December through 9 December. The C-117 had a primary mission of AUTOCAT/MANOCAT.

Flight crew training was initiated in the use of authenticators and situation reports on the progress of the problem. Situation maps of the 16th MEB scheme of maneuver were kept for this purpose.

The situation maps were a good start to keep the squadron up to date on the progress of the exercise. The only problem encountered with this was that the flow of information from PROVMA-20 was nearly non-existent as to the current progress of the exercise.

Overall the exercise from the intelligence standpoint was valuable to all concerned. Enlisted personnel, especially, gained experience in the fundamentals of gleaning essential information from the debriefing of the flight crews and translating this to a visual map form.

B. Comments and Recommendation

Item: Feedback of Intelligence Information for 251 to provide 100 sorties from D-Day through D+3 in support of Blue Air; however, 251 was directed

Comment: After an amphibious landing, frequent intelligence summaries giving the state of battle and position of enemy and friendly forces is of great value to the air unit participating in support of the landing assault and subsequent battle. It enables pilots engaged in CAS missions to have a background of information regarding the approximate position and strength of the enemy ground forces. This knowledge makes subsequent airborne briefing by the FAC on CAS strikes more realistic and is of great training value to pilots on exercises. During LANTFLEX no significant information was disseminated.

Recommendation: That continuing intelligence summaries be built into the problem as an effort to educate all forces as to the progress of the operation. for airborne radio relay (AUTOCAT/MANOCAT) and this was provided. Also the C-117 was maintained on an on-call basis when not airborne.

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Enclosure (1)

Enclosure (1)

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### III. S-3 Operations

#### A. Planning Phase

Early plans for this unit's deployment were made from information contained in the various operation orders that applied to VMFA-251. Ordnance requests and aircraft configurations were decided upon at this time in order to meet the various tasks that could be assigned to the F-4B including simulated, practice and live ordnance delivery. An examination of the proposed tempo of operations was made to determine the number of personnel required along with types and amount of materiel to support us while deployed. The operation orders called for 125 F-4B sorties to be flown between 4 and 9 December along with one sortie per day for the C-117 from 6 December through 9 December. The C-117 had a primary mission of AUTOCAT/MANOCAT.

Based on the above information the squadron operation order was written and included appropriate inputs from the intelligence section on the area to which VMFA 251 was deploying as well as situation briefs on surrounding areas.

#### B. Execution

Upon the completion of the above plan, the squadron ferried 11 F-4B's from it's home station to the deployment site.

The first day of the operations had VMFA-251 programmed for 10 sorties and these were scheduled and flown. The following day 251 was directed to provide 15 sorties in support of Orange Air, but flew only 14, 1 sortie being cancelled due to aircraft availability.

The PROVMAF-20 operation order called for 251 to provide 100 sorties from D-Day through D+3 in support of Blue Air; however, 251 was directed by FRAG order to fly only 69, of which 64 were launched.

A summary of operations by type mission is as follows:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>SORTIES SCHEDULED</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>
CAS	24	22
A/A CAP	39	36
AIR DEFENSE	2	2
STRIKE	4	4

During the same period the C-117 was committed to one mission per day for airborne radio relay (AUTOCAT/MANOCAT) and this was provided. Also the C-117 was maintained on an on-call basis when not airborne.

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C. Summary

VMFA-251 received a large amount of highly valuable training at the unit level during this exercise. All of the various missions which the F-4B is capable of performing were encountered and all pilots and NFO's learned what operations in a combat environment might be like. Demands were made on aircrew readiness and flexibility and the knowledge gained from these lessons is immeasurable.

D. Comments and Recommendations

Item 1: Use of Close Air Support Aircraft.

Comment: On 7 and 8 Dec (D+1 and D+2), out of 24 sorties of Close Air Support aircraft on station, a total of 9 sorties were used for CAS strikes. It is felt that training exercises such as LANTFLEX are invaluable for the training available in coordinating all supporting arms. For close air support this encompasses requirements for FAC's to recommend, coordinate, request and control air strikes. DASC's must carry requirements with aircraft available and pilots must learn map reading and target identification. Finally, close control of the supporting aircraft must be effected.

In training exercises, requirements for air support are normally generated by either actual or constructive simulated aggressors which do not normally require continuing use of aircraft. The result is wasted opportunities to practice the most difficult coordination problem of supporting arms.

Recommendation: That in future training exercises, TACP's be directed to request a minimum amount of Tactical Air Requests regardless of the situation on the ground.

Item 2: ECM Environment

Comment: VMFA-251 was tasked to be prepared to operate under a hostile ECM environment. No ECM was employed against airborne radar during the exercise, resulting in losing the opportunity for realistic training.

Recommendation: That ECM be employed in future exercises.

Item 3: Utilization of Autocat/Manocat Aircraft

Comment: During the period D-Day through D+3, a C-117 aircraft was on station for twenty-two hours. This aircraft had the capability for automatic retransmission (AUTOCAT) of radio messages, on UHF and VHF(FM) frequencies. In addition, it could manually relay (MANOCAT) messages on UHF, VHF(FM) and HF(USB) frequencies. All of these could be used simultaneously. During the period D-Day through D+2 only one attempt was made to use VHF AUTOCAT. This was unsuccessful due to undertrained reasons. Six FM MANOCAT messages were completed, with numerous non-exercise relays made on HF. On D+3, AUTOCAT was attempted and proved successful.

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It was felt that the non-use of this capability was the result of a lack of education. With better dissemination of information regarding the C-117 AUTOCAT/MANOCAT capability, an excellent alternate means of communications would have been available to the MEB.

Recommendation: That, AUTOCAT/MANOCAT aircraft be employed in future operations to be preceded by broad dissemination of its communications capabilities to unit commanders at all levels.

Item 4: Air attacks against transport aircraft

Comment: Although PROVMAC-20 OpOrder 3-66 directed that no attacks should be made on transport aircraft, the C-117 attached to VMFA-251 for AUTOCAT/MANOCAT missions was repeatedly attacked by Puerto Rico Air National Guard F-86's.

Recommendation: That positive steps are taken to ensure that relevant rules of engagement are brought to the attention of all participants in the air order of battle.

Item 5: Control and Employment of Air Defense Aircraft

Comment: Control of air-defense aircraft was marginal. Repeated occurrences of loss of radar contact by controlling agencies resulted in inadequate protection for friendly aircraft. On at least two instances, fighter aircraft were directed to effect their own rendezvous/intercept with no assistance from the controlling agency. This was assumedly the result of inadequate radar coverage of the AAW sector.

Recommendation: That on subsequent operations, provisions for more complete ground radar coverage be provided.

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#### IV. S-4 MATERIAL AND LOGISTICS

- A. The squadron required ten C-130 aircraft to move from MCAS Beaufort to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.

Total weight of passengers (272) and baggage	65,280 lbs.
Total weight of cargo	136,680 lbs.
Grand Total	201,960 lbs.
Total Cube	13,642 ft. <sup>3</sup>

- B. Support provided by Detachment Six, 2dMAW, was excellent.

21 General Purpose tents (Tent City)

3 4x4 Jeeps,  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton  
2 6x6 Trucks,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Ton  
1 4x4 Ambulance, M679  
1 6x6 Truck, MJ-2, Ordnance  
1 Truck, Stake Bed  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Ton.

Additionally, certain items of Ground Support Equipment were provided. Without these items and vehicles, the airlift requirements would be more than doubled.

#### C. Supply Support

1. Initial supply of spare parts was provided by a Pack up from MAG-32.
2. Support in the field was provided in part by the Aircraft Maintenance Department of Naval Station Roosevelt Roads but primarily by MAG-32 via the MARLOG.
3. Refueling of the aircraft was accomplished expeditiously due to the availability of the TAFDS adjacent to the Flight Line.

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13' 0" 1/2 1/2  
501' 0" 1/2 1/2  
130' 0" 1/2 1/2  
62' 0" 1/2 1/2



VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Planning:

VMFA-251 communications with PROVMAF-20 were planned to consist of a voice tactical Air Command Net to be activated at 0500 on 5 December and a teletype/crypto admin net to be activated at 0800 on 30 November.

B. Execution:

Nets were manned as scheduled but communications were marginal to poor. The quality of the admin net signal was not sufficient to permit use of teletype during the afloat phase. During the ashore phase, teletype was generally good except for a total of seven hours when there was a complete breakdown. Approximately three hours were lost due to generator failure in the squadron. During the remaining four hours, the squadron net was in full operation but could not contact PROVMAF 20 for reasons unknown to this unit. TAC net communications were generally good during daylight hours but signal strength was markedly reduced at night. The result was extreme difficulty in passing reports to meet required deadlines. The Naval Teletype System as a backup was inadequate. Delays in the delivery of Priority messages were as much as thirty hours.

C. Comment and Recommendation:

Item: Teletype Admin Nets

Comment: During the period control of air was afloat, no teletype was possible due to poor signal quality. Voice radio as a backup resulted in excessive delays in transmission. These problems should continue to exist until existing shipboard equipment is improved.

Recommendation:

That teletype communications using TRC-75 for ship-to-shore use not be attempted until its success can be assured. As a suitable substitute it is recommended that the use of CW be preferred to voice. The transmission of classified traffic remains a problem, the solution of which is beyond the capability of this command.

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Enclosure ( )



**ORDNANCE**

**NOMENCLATURE**

**NO. EXPENDED**

the primary purpose of the deployment to MCAS YUMA, ARIZONA was to familiarize the various problems and techniques of ordnance delivery	924
BOMB, PRACTICE, MK-76	60
BOMB, PRACTICE, WSF, 250 lb.	42
BOMB, GP, 250 lb. Low Drag, MK-81 and Readiness Syllabus. The training areas	70
BOMB, GP, 500 lb. Low Drag, MK-82 for various altitudes and dive angles. (2)	625
ROCKETS, 2.75 FFAR illumination, and tracking, (3) correct use of the conventional	136
ROCKETS, 5.00 ZUNT practicing delivery of dummy and live bombs, (4) day and	90
FLARE, PARACHUTE, MK-24 of the F4B optional sight in day and night delivery op-	

erations, (5) familiarization with delivery of dummy and live ordnance at night on a raked target and also on the close air support mission with aircraft flares for illumination and (7) the handling characteristics and take-off techniques for a heavily loaded F4B.

All aircraft received the maximum amount of training possible within the limitations of sorties available and the individual state of training.

Two major difficulties were encountered which had a detrimental effect on maintenance and flight operations during this period. Maintenance suffered due to the time delay inherent in delivering spare parts from HSB-32 to Yuma. This lag time is considered excessive for a normal two weeks deployment. Prepositioning of high usage parts at Yuma and North Island by NAVFAC PAC would alleviate this problem.

The second problem area was the scheduling of air transportation for the return to Beaufort. Due to the shortage of C-130's plus the lack of billeting space at Yuma, HSB-32 had to board the aircraft which ferried HSB-32 to Yuma, proceed to El Toro and return before departing for Beaufort the following day. The return schedule actually commenced from Yuma on the morning of the 19th and was completed at Beaufort the evening of the 22nd. This forced cancellation of 45 sorties at Yuma on the 19th and 20th and delayed the resumption of normal flight operations at Beaufort until the following week. This Squadron appreciated the commitments levied on HSB-32, however this spread out transportation situation caused a serious loss of flight operations to the deploying squadron. The start-up of F4B flight time is already acute without the loss of an additional week flying on each deployment.

In summary the deployment was extremely successful and due to the variety of targets available and excellent weather at Yuma, much more training was accomplished than could normally be expected at other available deployment bases.

G. H. KELLER, JR.

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NARRATIVE

The primary purpose of the deployment to MCAS YUMA, ARIZONA was to familiarize the newer aircrews with the various problems and techniques of ordnance delivery and also to further polish those aircrews who were already qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Training and Readiness Syllabus. The training areas covered were: (1) bomb/rocket patterns for various altitudes and dive angles, (2) target picture, identification, and tracking, (3) correct use of the conventional ordnance switches, (4) practicing delivery of dummy and live bombs, 2.75" FFAR and Zuni rockets, (5) proper use of the F4B optical sight in day and nite delivery operations, (6) familiarization with delivery of dummy and live ordnance at nite on a raked target and also on nite close air support missions with aircraft flares for illumination and (7) the handling characteristics and take-off technique for a heavily loaded F4B.

All aircrews received the maximum amount of training possible within the limitations of sorties available and the individual state of training.

Two major difficulties were encountered which had a detrimental effect on maintenance and flight operations during this period. Maintenance suffered due to the time delay inherent in delivering spare parts from MAC-32 to Yuma. This lag time is considered excessive for a normal two weeks deployment. Prepositioning of high usage parts at Yuma and North Island by NAVAIRSYSCOM would alleviate this problem.

The second problem area was the scheduling of air transportation for the return to Beaufort. Due to the shortage of C-130's plus the lack of billeting space at Yuma, VMFA-251 had to board the aircraft which ferried VMFA-312 to Yuma, proceed to El Toro and RON before departing for Beaufort the following day. The return schedule actually commenced from Yuma on the morning of the 19th and was completed at Beaufort the evening of the 22nd. This forced cancellation of 45 sorties at Yuma on the 19th and 20th and delayed the resumption of normal flight operations at Beaufort until the following week. This Squadron appreciated the commitments levied on VMCR-252, however this spread out transportation situation caused a serious loss of flight operations to the deploying squadron. The shortage of F4B flight time is already acute without the loss of an additional weeks flying on each deployment.

In summary the deployment was extremely successful and due to the variety of targets available and excellent weather at Yuma, much more training was accomplished than could normally be expected at other available deployment bases.

G. H. KELLER, JR.

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MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 251  
 Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF Lant  
 Marine Corps Air Station  
 Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

SUMMARY AND NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

YUMA DEPLOYMENT 6-19 SEPT 66

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32

Subj: Post- Deployment report, Yuma; for period 6-19 September 1966

X/C to MCAS YUMA	71.8
Total 7-17 Sept at MCAS YUMA	281.5
X/C back to MCAS BEAUFORT	41.1
Total Deployment	394.4
Average Flight Hours Per Pilot	19.7

SORTIES

Scheduled 7-17 Sept at MCAS YUMA	228
Completed 7-17 Sept at MCAS YUMA	215
Sorties Completion rate	94%

Average Pilot Readiness	Start Deployment	47%
	End Deployment	57%

Average RIO Readiness	Start Deployment	69%
	End Deployment	71%

Syllabus Flights Completed (including syllabus Flights completed enroute to and from YUMA)

	<u>PILOTS</u>	<u>RIO's</u>
PHASE I	24	5
PHASE II		
WEAPONS	9	0
BOMBS/ROCKETS	90	25
NAPALM	22	3
CAS (Day & Night)	35	10
Total Pilot	180	Total
		RIO 43





Flight Lieutenant  
Christopher Carr-White

## RAF Exchange Pilot Joins VMFA-251 For Duty Tour

If Paul Revere was spreading the latest scoop on British troop movements in the Beaufort area, he would have to trade in his horse for a jet to get the news out.

A Royal Air Force pilot, Flight Lieutenant Christopher Carr-White, arrived here from England last week to begin a two-year tour of duty with VMFA-251.

The British officer and his wife, Celia, were officially welcomed aboard the Air Station by his new commanding officer, LtCol Gordon H. Keller Jr.

Flight Lieutenant Carr-White is believed to be the first British officer to serve at this Air Station in the exchange pilot program conducted by the United States and foreign countries.

A native of Lymington, England, Lieutenant Carr-White graduated from the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell, England.

Since then, the Flight Lieutenant, which is equal in rank to a Captain in the Marine Corps, has served at British bases in Germany and Cyprus, plus numerous bases in England.

He will be performing the duties of assistant operations officer with VMFA-251 when not flying the sleek supersonic F4B "Phantom" jet of the "Thunderbolt" squadron.

The British couple will reside at 154 Laurel Bay Blvd., Laurel Bay, S. C., during their stay here.

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**MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 251**  
Marine Aircraft Group 32, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant  
Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

**JAN 5 1967**

**From:** Commanding Officer  
**To:** Commanding Officer, MAG-32

**Subj:** Post-Deployment Report for Period 26 Nov 66 - 16 Dec 66,  
submission of

**Encl:** (1) VMFA-251 Post-Deployment Report  
(2) VMFA-251 LANTFLEX Post-Exercise Report (Original Only)  
(3) COMLANTFLTWPNRAN INST. P3120.1A (Original Only)

1. During the period 26 November to 16 December 1966, VMFA-251 deployed with 11 F4B's and 284 personnel to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. The first of three planned tasks was to conduct test firings of Sparrow Missiles in support of Project Sparrow Shoot. The second task was to participate in LANTFLEX 66 as both friendly and aggressor air in a variety of missions. Any available periods not devoted to the above efforts were used to accomplish normal syllabus training.

2. Enclosures (1) and (2) constitute a concise review of the entire deployment and an appraisal of the facilities, support, and operating conditions of the deployment base.

3. Enclosure (3) contains the latest information on the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range Facilities.

4. The deployment was successful and all missions and tasks were accomplished in a satisfactory manner. However, the conclusion that must be drawn from the information presented in enclosure (1) is that NS Roosevelt Roads is not a highly desirable deployment base for Air to Ground Training by F4B Squadrons.

5. This report is declassified upon removal of enclosure (2)

C. Another area where personnel shortages was near critical was in communications. The 13 persons assigned were required to man a tactical net and an administrative net 24 hours-a-day for approximately six days during LANTFLEX 66. Only an equipment shortage negated the requirement to maintain a third net with MAG-32. This would have imposed an unacceptable burden on 13 men.

**L. R. HAWKINS**

D. Normal operating procedures were followed by both the deployed and rear-echelon units. The 2d Marine Aircraft Wing's major administrative problems were

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1- CO

ENCLOSURE (5) 3

4- Group

Tab F- #2



WILSON CARBON VIL. SEVENTH: BOCHLOLE: BOCHP CHLOTTING SADOOS  
BOCHP VILCHLOLE CARBON 25: 30 BOCHP VILCHLOLE CARBON: BOCHP

### III. 3-3 Operations

1. Any information contained in operations orders from F20043-20,

33 Marine Officers

2

2141 plan for the correction of the

2  
7

ABS-32

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(1972) and Applefield Corporation  
 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651,

- 1-2 November - Alternate dates for 1965-66. See page 2.

1-2 December - Air-to-ground combat delivery training.

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t and an administrative net 24 hours-a-day for approx-  
imate during JANUARY 66. Only an equipment shortage

days during LANTFLEX 66. Only an equipment shortage

days during LANTFLEX 66. Only an equipment shortage requirement to maintain a third net with MAG-32. This

requirement to maintain a third net with MAG-32. This imposed an unacceptable burden on 13 men.

imposed an unacceptable burden on 13 men.

imposed an unacceptable burden on 13 men.

ing to the reported departure date. The above was

ating procedures were followed by both the deployed and

ating procedures were followed by both the deployed and units of the S-1 section. No major administrative

units of the S-1 section. No major administrative

units of the S-1 section. No major administrative  
re encountered.

was airborne at 0413. Since the flight was made one-stop, no

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ENCLOSURE (1)



## II. S-2 Intelligence

- A. The major efforts of the S-2 Section were devoted to preparations for and operations during LANTFLEX 66 to include planning, briefing and debriefing of aircrews, and compilation of intelligence summaries. Enclosure (2) contains a more detailed synopsis of S-2 activities during the fleet exercise.
- B. During the deployment the S-2 Section assumed the additional task of Squadron S & C. Incoming classified messages were logged in, disseminated to appropriate personnel, and then filed. Outgoing classified matter was properly stamped, serialized, and entered into the system.

## III. S-3 Operations

### A. Planning

1. From information contained in operations orders from PROVMAF-20, 16thMEB, and ComCarDivTwo, VMFA-251 planned the requirements for participating in LANTFLEX 66. Concurrently, plans were made to participate in Project Sparrow Shoot and to conduct normal syllabus training as circumstances permitted.
2. The following was the chronological plan for the duration of the deployment:

26-27-28 November- Movement to NS Roosevelt Roads.

28 November- Briefing by Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range (AFWR) and Airfield Operations

29-30 November- Primary dates for Project Sparrow Shoot.

1-2 December- Alternate dates for Project Sparrow Shoot. If not required, then air-to-ground ordnance delivery training.

3 December- Maintenance Standdown.

4-5 December- LANTFLEX 66, participating as aggressor (ORANGE) air.

6-10 December- LANTFLEX 66, participating as friendly (BLUE) air under command of PROVMAF-20.

11 December- Standdown.

12-16 December- Air-to-ground ordnance delivery training.

17-19 December- Return to MCAS Beaufort.

### B. Execution

1. Movement. Movement to Roosevelt Roads was accomplished expeditiously with all aircraft, transports and fighters, adhering to the scheduled departure times. The eleven F4B's were scheduled to depart in sections starting at 0800 on 27 November and following at 15 minute intervals. The first section took off at 0802 and the last section (the 11th aircraft) was airborne at 0913. Since the flight was made non-stop, no problems involving staging for refueling were encountered.



2. Briefings. Briefings both for the conduct of Sparrow Shoot and normal operations were held in the AFWR conference room. Briefings were thorough and comprehensive.

3. Sparrow Shoot. Coordination and supervision of Sparrow Shoot was excellent. The efforts expended by the Second MAF Missile Analysis Team were noteworthy. Problems associated with the exercise were:

- a. COMSERVLANT had not authorized the release of missiles for VMFA-251's use which contributed to a one day delay in commencing Sparrow Shoot.
- b. Telemetry packs for the missiles had not been sent to Roosevelt Roads. These packs were delivered on 28 November by a special F-4 flight from MCAS Beaufort to Roosevelt Roads by VMFA-312. This delay coupled with the lack of missiles resulted in a one day postponement.
- c. One flight was scrubbed because the target launch aircraft did not launch on schedule. This seemed to be the rule rather than the exception and was subsequently countered by the firing aircraft not starting engines until the targets were airborne. Using this procedure, no further problems were encountered.

4. LANTFLEX 66. Participation in LANTFLEX 66, though not beneficial in completion of syllabus training flights, did serve to indoctrinate aircrews in support missions which could be demanded of them during tours in combat zones. It also served to provide a common squadron effort in support of the mission assigned VMFA-251. Significant items concerning LANTFLEX 66 are included in enclosure (2). Missions flown in support of LANTFLEX were as follows:

4-5 December (ORANGE AIR)

Sorties

Mission

6

Anti-Shipping

14

Combat Air Patrol

2

Testex 5A

Totals: Sorties - 22; Hours - 35.0

6-10 December (BLUE AIR)

Sorties

Mission

23

CAS

40

CAP

7

TPQ

Totals: Sorties - 70; Hours - 131.7



Additional Flights by C-117 Assigned AUTOCAT/MANOCAT missions  
(6-9 Dec): 4 Sorties, 25.8 Hours.

5. Deployment Support

a. NS Roosevelt Roads

- (1) Sparrow Shoot. Roosevelt Roads facilities to support Sparrow firing is excellent. GCI coverage, communications, operations, and target facilities are geared to support exercises of this nature. The smooth operation of this particular exercise was influenced by the coordination provided by the Second MAW Missile Analysis Team. In future exercises it would be highly desirable to assign coordinating personnel who have participated in similar exercises.
- (2) Air-to-Air Weapons. Radar surveillance of the operating area is outstanding and available through either AFWR or the Puerto Rican Air National Guard (PRANG). Either agency provides excellent control of intercepts; however, AFWR control may not always be available due to controller commitments during missile firing exercises. No airspace problems were encountered.
- (3) Familiarization Flights. During the period covered by the deployment, the weather was marginally satisfactory for conducting familiarization flights. Low broken ceilings with frequent showers prevailed for the duration of the deployment. Weather movement was very rapid and difficult to forecast for short periods. The only suitable divert field is Ramey AFB located 90 miles to the Northwest. Additionally, the VFR traffic pattern for Runway 06 (used during the entire deployment) is non-standard requiring a very wide abeam position and approximately a two mile groove. Starting at maximum landing weights a maximum of four approaches were possible.
- (4) Conventional Air-to-Ground. A complete description of air-to-ground targets is included in enclosure (3). The Culebra target complex is varied and has high potential; however, certain factors make it undesirable for the training of inexperienced aviators. These factors are:
  - (a) Only two targets were marked with concentric rings-Target #14 and Agua Cay. Fungy Bowl and Twin Rocks were nothing more than small rock islets.
  - (b) Target #14 is placed on the side of a hill which



effectively reduces the magnitude of miss distances in elevation.

- (c) Target #14 is located in a ship bombardment impact area which is used constantly and therefore not available for aircraft.
- (d) All spotting of hits is by single line rake using Battery Commander's scope rather than by triangulation resulting in hit information being approximate.
- (e) Approximately one third of the Agua Cay target is not visible from the Observation Post. Hits in that area, when reported, are rough estimates. (TAB A)
- (f) No visible run-in lines are provided. This effectively negates any dive angle information.
- (g) Dive angle is measured by a crude portable device which is highly inaccurate. Only one such device is available and must be transported to the target in use. (TAB A)
- (h) The weather in the target area is typical of that found in tropical/sub-tropical island areas. Scattered-to-broken clouds with bases of 1500 feet and tops of approximately 6000 feet exist throughout the majority of the day. The only period when reasonable visibility of the target could be expected was during the period from 0900 to 1300.
- (i) The foregoing factors reduce the desirability of the Culebra targets for the basic air-to-ground training of new aviators. During this phase of training, rigid control of runs must be exercised to teach pattern, sight picture, dive angle, speeds, altitudes, etc., in an effort to form a sound background for more advanced work. Aviators who have completed approximately one-third to one-half of the A/G syllabus can put the prevailing conditions at Culebra to good use since all aviators must develop the ability to counter adverse conditions when attacking a target.
- (j) Advantages inherent in the Culebra complex are:
  - ((1)) Close proximity to the airfield.
  - ((2)) Little concern of overflight of populated areas with ordnance aboard.

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((3)) Air-to-Air intercept airspace is overhead and increases the ability to accomplish dual missions.

(5) Close Air Support. The use of the Vieques Eastern Impact area for close air support under the control of AFWR Personnel was not satisfactory. No permanent TACP personnel are available to control air strikes. There is a possibility of making liaison with Marine TACP's temporarily based at Vieques for this purpose; however, none were available during the deployment period. Without control of TACP's, the aircrews were not exposed to the proper manner in which a CAS mission is briefed and controlled; nor did they gain important experience in the use of maps to identify targets. The impact area consists of an airfield, SAM site, fuel farm, various vehicles and aircraft which are better suited to interdiction type targets than CAS because of the lack of pinpoint hard targets. For proper training of aircrews in CAS missions, it is necessary to stress the importance of proximity of friendly troops to an exact target such as a bunker or a trench line.

(6) TPQ. An Air Support Radar Team from MASS-2 is stationed at Roosevelt Roads and is available for TPQ training. Control is excellent, targets are adequate.

(7) IFR Procedures. No local IFR departure/recovery is available unless aircrews file a DD-175. No standard radar handoff procedure exists between San Juan Center and Roosevelt Roads GCA. The TACAN approach is an antiquated VOR type pattern which holds aircraft at seven nautical miles in the cone of confusion to penetrate via a teardrop to a TACAN gate. Airfield Operations did indicate that the FAA had been contacted to work out a suitable agreement for local IFR handling.

#### C. Summary of Operations

##### 1. Syllabus Training Flights Completed

	<u>Pilots</u>	<u>RIO's</u>	
Phase I Fam, Inst, & Nav	15	1	
Phase II Weapons	18	3	
Bombs & Rockets	24	3	
TPQ	6	0	
CAS	12	5	
Syllabus Flights (X's) Planned for Deployment			97
Syllabus Flights (X's) Completed			87
Percentage of Planned Training Completed			89.7%

##### 2. Average Pilot Readiness



DOMESTICATED OF HUMANITY WITHIN THE JUNGLE, a few ho-  
 usey the savagery to control the people. There is a  
 balance of the war effort. No element of the balance  
 view for close with the people and the control of the  
 (2) Close with the people. The use of the people is the

Start Of Deployment 49%  
 End Of Deployment 51%

3. Average RIO Readiness

Start Of Deployment 75%  
 End Of Deployment 76%

4. Flight Time for Deployment (Including flights to and from  
 Roosevelt Roads)

Total Hours - 432.4  
 Total Sorties - 237  
 Average Flight Hours per Pilot - 24  
 Average Flight Hours per RIO - 32

5. Ordnance

<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>No. Expended</u>
Bomb, Practice, MK-76	140
Bomb, Practice, WSP, 250 lb.	9
Bomb, GP, 250 lb. Low Drag, MK-81	31
Rockets, 2.75" FFAR	178
Rockets, 5.00" Zuni	26

D. Selected pictures of the Culebra targets are found in Tab A  
 of this enclosure.

IV. S-4 Materiel and Logistics

A. Motor Transport. Motor Transport was adequate but only by  
 careful planning and utilization of equipment. The physical  
 layout of Roosevelt Roads imposes an abnormal transportation  
 requirement. Officer's messing and billeting is approximately  
 eight miles. All transportation had to be supplied by the  
 squadron. Transportation to the enlisted billeting area  
 presented no problem and was mainly filled by a shuttle bus  
 routinely operated for that purpose. Parts requiring main-  
 tenance outside of the squadron area required transportation.  
 The squadron was supplied with the following vehicles:

Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2 T, 6x6, M35A1	2
Truck, 1/2 T, 4x4, M38A1	3
Truck, 2 1/2 T, Stakebed	1*

\* for use by ordnance

The trucks, 1/2 Ton, M38A1 were substituted for the Cerlist M677  
 and M676 authorized by Wing Order 4040.1B.

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WFO of Detachment  
SFO of Detachment  
2. Attached to the Squadron

B. Motor Transport Drivers. Wing Order 4040.1B requires the deployed squadron to furnish Detachment Six with three (3) Motor Vehicle Operators (MOS 3531). These were supplied from augmentation personnel from MABS-32 as indicated in Section I of this enclosure. Although not specifically stated in WO 4040.1B, it was assumed that personnel of this category would be used as drivers for the vehicles assigned the deployed squadron. In actuality, only one of the three drivers were assigned to VMFA-251, the other two being used as determined by the OIC of Detachment Six. Consequently, drivers for five of the six vehicles assigned the squadron had to be furnished from squadron personnel. It is felt that augmentation personnel supplied to Detachment Six should be used in direct support of the deployed squadron and it is recommended that in future deployments the matter be clarified so as to provide for either the augmentation drivers to be used by the deployed squadron or additional personnel be supplied by MABS-32 to fill this need.

C. Buildings and Grounds.

1. General. Space requirements for offices, shops and aircraft maintenance is adequately filled by the tent city. Aircraft maintenance shelter requirements are marginally filled by the strong-back tent nose dock which offers partial protection for one aircraft. The frequency of rain experienced during the deployment requires an additional two shelters suitable for fire control maintenance.

2. Latrines. The two field latrines were declared unsanitary by the squadron medical officer on arrival at Roosevelt Roads. Assistance was supplied by Detachment Six and Naval Station Public Works to dig two new latrines. Subsequently, the NS Fire Department would not grant permission for periodically burning out the latrines. Chemical sanitation methods were used exclusively. The frequency of rain encountered during the deployment requires that the latrine shelters be improved to provide adequate protection. It is recommended that the shelters be improved and a permanent agreement between Detachment Six and NS Roosevelt Roads be reached in regards to field sanitation.

3. Maintenance Equipment. No equipment for police of working areas was available. It is desired that Detachment Six provide the necessary brooms, mops, etc. WO 4040.1B provides for Project 40 funds for maintenance of DET SIX equipment be provided by MWSG-27. It is recommended that these funds include budgeting for cleaning equipment.

4. Water Point. No fresh water point is established at the tent city. All fresh water must be hauled in by a M-107 Water Trailer.



D. Materiel. No F4B peculiar supplies are available at NS Roosevelt Roads. All supply support was to be by a Section "B" pack-up of high usage items to be supplied by MAG-32 Group Supply. Additional supply support was to have been direct from MCAS Beaufort utilizing the semi-weekly MARLOG flight. Supply management at Roosevelt Roads was to have been accomplished by augmenting the squadron with two supply men. This proved to be inadequate and in future similar deployments, three persons will be requested. The parts list for the Section "B" packup was submitted to MAG-32 supply on 8 November 1966. An additional list of tires was requested by Group Supply and was submitted on 15 November. Because of lack of parts only approximately 67% of the requested parts were supplied. The extent of the lack of requested parts was not realized until arrival at Roosevelt Roads since no inventory was supplied with the pack-up. It is recommended that inventories be furnished in future deployments. Difficulty was experienced in receiving follow-up parts from Beaufort on 1 December due to lack of space on the MARLOG aircraft. Additionally, no space was ever available for return of equipment needing repair to Beaufort. Since the supply problem is a continuing one it is necessary for a standard procedure to be adopted which will provide for the blocking of space on MARLOG flights for units deployed to bases serviced by those flights.

#### V. Aircraft Maintenance

A. Maintenance support for the deployment was planned to consist mainly of organizational maintenance with augmentation personnel from H&MS-32 to provide limited IMA avionics support. Work beyond the IMA capability established at Roosevelt Roads was to have been evacuated to MCAS Beaufort for normal IMA repair. No significant deviations from maintenance plans were made.

B. Lack of IMA support at Roosevelt Roads and the non-availability of sufficient test equipment in the custody of H&MS-32 resulted in avionics vans equipped for communications navigation and electrical support were obtained on temporary loan from MAG-24. These were in addition to two vans supplied by H&MS-32 for fire control support.

C. Problems encountered during the deployment were as follows:

1. Avionics vans received from MAG-24 were turned around from a Yuma deployment in insufficient time for the installed equipment to be adequately checked out. Delivery of the vans was made at Roosevelt Roads which resulted in maintenance delays until the vans could be made operational.

2. No technical library was supplied with the fire control vans obtained from H&MS-32.

3. Short lead time in obtaining all of the maintenance vans resulted in personnel not being familiar with the vans and



requiring an indoctrination period at the commencement of the deployment. Under ideal conditions it is felt that maintenance crews should have an opportunity to work in vans for a minimum of one week prior to the deployment. This would insure the operational status of the vans, provide needed training, and reduce the maintenance time during the deployment.

4. No 400 cycle power for the avionics vans was initially available. An MMG-1 converter was on hand but not wired. On request Public Works installed commercial power to the MMG-1 which, when activated proved to be faulty and of no use. A 400 cycle converter was obtained from Public Works and used to provide limited power to the van complex.

5. IMA Avionics parts (bits and pieces) were of insufficient quantity to support an extended deployment. This was in addition to the deficiencies in the section "B" organizational pack-up (Section IV of this enclosure).

6. The following equipment pre-positioned in accordance with WO 4040.1B and required by this squadron was not available in operating condition:

	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>
(1)	1	MMG-1 400 cycle converter
(2)	1	5000 psi Air Compressor
(3)	2	50 gallon LOX trailers

7. Pad eyes were not in sufficient quantity or adequately spaced to provide proper tie-down facilities for F4B aircraft.

- D. Liaison visits to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads Aircraft Maintenance Department revealed that the following Ground Support Equipment is available to support transient units:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
NCPP-105	5
Tow Tractor	12
Air Compressor (5000 psi)	5
NB-2 Generator	4
NB-3 Air Conditioner	3
NC-5 Generator	7
NC-7 Generator	4
NC-10 Generator	3
Maintenance Platform	15
Hydraulic Test Stand(190GPM)	4
Tow Bar	10
4000 A Stand, Eng Removal	8
3000 B Stand	4
10 Ton Axle Jacks	5
Well Start Unit w/10 Consoles (Located at AMD Hanger)	

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E. The following limitations exist in Roosevelt Roads AMD capability to support F4B squadrons:

1. No compass rose is located on the airfield.
2. AMD welding machine was inoperable due to lack of parts.
3. AMD Veri-Drive unit did not have the adapters for F4B CSD and generator.
4. AMD has no F4B IMA avionics support.
5. Support for transient squadron after 1630 hours is difficult due to lack of sufficient personnel to operate a night crew.

F. It should be noted that regardless of its limitations, the Roosevelt Roads AMD was helpful and cooperative and willing to assist within its capabilities.

G. 3 M Reports. A continuing problem exists in the submission of reports required by the 3 M system. Final reports for each month are required to be received by MAG-32 within 24 hours of the termination of the period. The only way that this can be consistently complied with during deployments is schedule a special airlift usually using tactical aircraft. Failure to do this results in non-compliance with existing directives and omission of a squadrons data from monthly analysis. It is recommended that either deployed squadrons be exempted from reports when submission is impractical or that specific recommendation be made to change the existing time frame to one which would be satisfactory for deployed squadrons.

VI. Communications. MABS-32 communications personnel were attached to provide communications during LANTFLEX 66. Comments concerning communications during LANTFLEX are included in enclosure (2). On termination of LANTFLEX communications were established with MAG-32 headquarters using on-line crypto teletype. This proved to be an excellent means of communications and its use should be considered for similar deployments.

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